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Executive summary
Over the past 20 years the aggressive reassertion of neoliberalism, the renewal and expansion 
of repressive state capacities and the effort of the 
establishment to contain growing popular unrest in 
the wake of the current financial crisis has resulted 
in an inevitable escalation of conflict between the 
Left and policing organizations throughout Europe. 
These developments raise serious questions about 
the evolving nature, direction and intensification 
of police coercion. The current conjuncture has 
also produced the very real possibility of electoral 
majorities by progressive Left parties on the heels 
of wider popular mobilizations.  This necessitates 
reflection on the possibility of progressive police 
reform as part of a strategy of the Left, whether in 
opposition or in government. 
What complicates this task is that, despite consid-
erable advances in Leftist and Marxist state theory, 
the police remain the least theorized and under-
stood state institution among the Left. Undoubt-
edly, the practical experience of the police role in 
political struggles has forced the Left into a reactive 
and instrumentalist theoretical stance according to 
which the police merely dispense coercion on behalf 
of the ruling class and must therefore be challenged 
unambiguously on every possible occasion.  The 
grave political implications of this stance are not 
limited to a self-perpetuating a state of mutual 
suspicion and hostility, but they also compromise 
the Left’s ability to address consistently and per-
suasively questions of policing, law and order. In 
short, this stance stifles the Left’s ability to build 
a dialogue about the future and proffer a vision of 
a post-capitalist policing system that is safer and 
more democratic.
Various political audiences that are potentially 
open to the political message of the Left and are key 
to its electoral success are unwilling to endorse a 
negative view of the police role that offers no vision 
of order and public safety. Working-class citizens 
rely on the police for the performance of critical 
peacekeeping functions in everyday life. The iro-
ny is that the Left, by being confined to a form of 
permanent opposition against the practices of the 
really existing police end up reifying and reinforcing 
paramilitarised police bureaucracies and missing the 
connection between the bourgeois notion of police 
science in capitalist society that subtends the entire 
global economic system. We argue that the Left 
should interrogate and seek to replace this bourgeois 
understanding of police in a democratic transition 
to socialism.  In fact, we would argue that the Left 
ought to make public safety the centre of their strat-
egy to wrest the police mechanism from the effective 
control of the interests of the capitalist class. 
‘Police science’ as a broad vision of social order 
had been a key preoccupation of bourgeois intel-
lectuals throughout the period of the emergence of 
capitalist social relations.  So much so, that we can 
say that it ought to be considered the foundational 
science of capitalism parallel in significance and 
meaning to political economy. The issue for such 
intellectuals as William Petty, Nicolas Delamare, 
Patrick Colqhoun or even Adam Smith was, from 
the beginning, how to forge a social order conducive 
to capitalist economic growth and the pacification 
of the newly disenfranchised and increasingly un-
ruly subordinate populations during the transition 
from feudalism to capitalism. ‘Police’ in this sense 
had been a much wider concept, at once applying to 
collective welfare, an ordered political body and the 
forging of a productive labour force. 
In short, early and classical bourgeois thought de-
veloped a police science intended to support a pro-
cess of pacification within the contours of capitalist 
social organization. Even though the concept of 
police was subsequently narrowed down to denote a 
particular type of bureaucracy, the broader projects 
of fabricating a social order conducive to capitalist 
production and consumption still underpin the 
dominant discourse on security. ‘Security’ today is 
hegemonic precisely because it encompasses visions 
and strategies pertaining to the reproduction of cap-
italist social relations in their entirety. In the same 
way that bourgeois police science once fabricated a 
new order for the transition to capitalism, the chal-
lenge for the Left is to build a new understanding of 
security that represents nothing less than a police 
5 DISCUSSION PAPER # 4/2014
system that facilitates a transition to a new demo-
cratic social and economic order—to think through 
a socialist police science.
As in all complex organizations, dissent and 
political ruptures are present within police organ-
izations. In the present context of austerity, fiscal 
constraints and privatisation an opportunity exists 
to undercut the historic alliance between the police 
and the Right, in so far as neoliberalism systemat-
ically undermines the very notion of public good 
which the police are employed and sworn to up-
hold. A prerequisite for the successful pursuit of 
this opportunity is to acknowledge police labour 
and develop strategies and policies empowering the 
police as worker: a successful strategy for the pro-
gressive reform of the police does not merely consist 
on besieging the police mechanism from outside 
by introducing elements of democratic oversight 
and control, but also to democratize the division 
of labour and the systems of work within the po-
lice organization.  The same applies par excellence 
to corporate security where, we suggest, the most 
precarious and alienated forms of policing labour 
exist today. 
While we emphasize that Left strategies for po-
licing reform will depend on the particular char-
acteristics of the national context in each case, we 
propose six general tenets encompassing the priori-
tisation of security as public good, of social fairness, 
integrity and democratic control. A Left strategy for 
police reform should seek to:
1. Reframe public safety: the police today have an 
extremely wide mandate that encompasses a vari-
ety of tasks ranging from everyday peacekeeping 
to crime control and state security. Nevertheless, 
the bulk of police services depend heavily on 
front-line personnel and pertain to upholding the 
conditions of peaceful social coexistence without 
recourse to the use of force. At the strategic pol-
icy level, the Left must seek to instil in the police 
mandate the prioritization of public safety above 
all else - understood as a preoccupation with the 
minimisation of harmful outcomes in everyday 
life. This may entail both an intensification of 
police activity in certain areas of social life, and, 
importantly a contraction or complete withdraw-
al from others.
2. Redefine the police professional: the Left must 
pursue a break with established notions of police 
professionalism which have given rise to the dom-
inant model of police organisation characterised 
by militarism and bureaucratism. It must force 
a re-envisaging of the police service bringing 
the qualities and abilities of police personnel 
at the forefront and encourage organizational 
designs and systems of delivery that promote 
social awareness, expertise, initiative and sound 
decision- making among police personnel. These 
should be supported by the development of pro-
fessional knowledge and standards pertinent to 
community needs, and by systems of initial and 
career-long learning and training conforming to 
and nurturing such knowledge and standards.  
3. Establish a dense network of external controls: 
a Left strategy for police reform must actively 
seek to establish a decentralized system of citizen 
consultation, oversight and control that will com-
plement the system of legislative and judiciary 
controls that typically exists under conditions of 
liberal democracy and which will aim to enhance 
local responsiveness and accountability of the 
police. Such a system can involve the establish-
ment of elected police boards at national and local 
levels. Internal police procedures should also be 
integrated with this system of external controls 
so as to offer a higher degree of protection and 
autonomy to individual police officers.
4. Implement democratic restructuring: democrat-
ic restructuring of the police organization should 
generally follow the principles of geographical 
and administrative decentralization. It should 
involve a reallocation of police resources towards 
front-line units responding to community needs 
and priorities, as well as a strengthening of the 
ability of front-line personnel to take initiative 
and formulate effective responses in consultation 
with communities. 
5. Facilitate citizen participation: in line with the 
previous tenet, a Left strategy for police reform 
should actively explore ways to strengthen and 
generalize citizen participation in police decision 
making, and even operations. These participa-
tory structures could involve the introduction of 
local meetings between police, citizens and oth-
er organizations during which formal decisions 
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about local policing priorities should be made 
and subsequently reviewed. A further step may 
involve the introduction of part-time and auxil-
iary personnel which will be recruited from the 
local citizenry and will be integrated with police 
operational units as much as feasible; and,
6. Engage directly with private policing: the Left 
must acknowledge that even an extensive restruc-
turing and reallocation of public police resources, 
this may not immediately eliminate a reliance on 
private security, which is an important and per-
haps irreversible characteristic of contemporary 
policing. The Left should pursue the introduction 
of a regulatory regime that renders the functions 
of private security compatible with the princi-
ples and priorities of the public police system as 
they emerge from the preceding tenets—in this 
respect, there exists a considerable margin for in-
tervention in the structure of private security or-
ganizations, encouraging more democratic forms 
of ownership such as worker-owned security co-
operatives, division of labour and accountability.
In the particular case of Greece, a Left strategy 
for police reform must take into account certain 
characteristics emanating from the historical devel-
opment of Hellenic policing in that country.  The 
police in Greece exhibit the traits of a ‘continental’, 
state-controlled, militarised police bureaucracy (a 
brief survey of different police models can be found 
in the Appendix), but these have been relatively 
hardened due to the close affiliation of the police 
with the political right and the explicit political role 
the regimes of the Right in their various manifesta-
tions (monarchy, cold war hard-line conservativism 
or dictatorship) have assigned to the police histor-
ically. As a result, acute militarism and bureauc-
ratism have adversely impacted the quality of police 
service and the relations between the police and 
the public.  The weight of this institutional history 
continues to encumber progressive reform efforts 
as they tend to permeate the organization, deploy-
ment, methods and attitudes of the police. 
In the present conjuncture, the rising influence of 
the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party among the Hel-
lenic Police (as evidenced by the voting behaviour 
of police and instances of practical cooperation 
between police and Golden Dawn activists) can be 
best understood as a consequence of these histori-
cally-rooted characteristics of the police apparatus 
in Greece.
It follows that a progressive police reform strategy 
in Greece not only must be more gradualist and 
carefully formulated, so as to nurture the develop-
ment of alliances between the political Left and stra-
tegic segments within the Hellenic Police, but also 
in some important respects it must strive to achieve 
goals that in other advanced liberal democracies 
are already taken for granted. With the prospect 
of a government of the Left in mind, we propose a 
number of steps that could initiate this process. The 
reform programme should aim to: 
•	Establish a research and strategic unit guided by a 
team of experts, with extensive powers to collect, 
audit, report and share data on police activity and 
to monitor and evaluate police practice;
•	Create a comprehensive and multi-tiered person-
nel system and database with a view to establish-
ing a system of regular professional development 
planning and review: 
•	Establish an updated system of regular mandatory 
retraining as a distinct component of police acad-
emy training;
•	Establish an independent National Police Board 
and bring the Hellenic Police under its immediate 
control;
•	Commission a study for the restructuring and 
decentralisation of the Hellenic Police, in combi-
nation with a wide process of public consultation; 
•	Remove all paramilitary police units from regular 
service in everyday policing; 
•	Revise, harmonise and codify all existing primary 
and secondary legislation governing police pow-
ers; 
•	Review and revise the system of incentives and 
rewards applying to serving police personnel and 
relate it to the outcomes of their professional de-
velopment planning; and, 
•	Revise and codify all legislation regarding private 
security, in accordance with the regulatory princi-
ples explained above).
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1.0 Introduction
It may be said that the least theorized and under-stood state institution among the Left is that of 
the police.  While radical thinkers for some time 
have grappled with the relative role of the state in 
a larger political context,1 the police have generally 
been viewed within an antagonistic lens based on 
a long history of struggle and direct experiences 
with infiltration, provocation, pacification, and the 
undermining of progressive social movements since 
at least the mid-1800s. As social movements of the 
Left have diversified their tactics with some success, 
policing organizations have similarly implemented 
more diverse and draconian methods of pacification 
in response.2  The last two decades, in particular, 
have seen a re-escalation of conflict between the Left 
and policing organizations in Europe and around 
the world.
This antagonism, while certainly justified in the 
context of struggle and resistance has also ham-
pered the Left’s ability to produce a fulsome and 
genuinely analytic understanding of the police.3  As 
a result, despite advances in more nuanced thinking 
about the capitalist state and its role in the liberal 
international order among radical thinkers, a rather 
instrumental understanding of policing persists. 
1  Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, trans. Winston 
Moore and Paul Cammack (London: Verso, 1985), Nicos 
Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, trans. Patrick Camiller 
(London: Verso, 2014., orig. 1980)
2  David Graeber, Direct Action: An Ethnography (Oakland, 
CA: AK Press, 2009), Nicholas Lamb and George Rigakos, 
„Pacification through ‚Intelligence‘ During the Toronto G20,“ 
Pp.  The State on Trial: Policing Protest, eds. Margaret E. Beare 
and Nathalie Des Rosiers (Vancouver: UBC Press, Forthcom-
ing), Luis. Fernandez, Policing Dissent: Social Control and 
the Anti-Globalization Movement. (Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers 
University Press, 2008, Luis Fernandez and Christian Scholl, 
„The Criminalization of Global Protest: The Application of 
Counter-Insurgency,“ Pp. 275-98 Urban (in)Security: Policing in 
Neoliberal Times, eds. Volker Eick and Kendra Briken (Ottawa: 
Red Quill Books, 2014). 
3  Cyril D. Robinson, „The Deradicalization of the Policeman: A 
Historical Analysis,“ Crime and Delinquency Apr. (1978): 129-
51.551-5, Robert Reiner, „The Police in the Class Structure,“ 
British Journal of Law and Society 5 (1978): 166-84
This lack of theoretical development is particularly 
disappointing because, as we shall argue, a complete 
understanding of the capitalist state and the func-
tioning of the capitalist world economy is impos-
sible without grasping the central role policing has 
played in the fabrication of this global order.  
Marx aptly observed in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury during the arrival of what we now understand 
as the first modern Anglo-Saxon constabulary, that 
“security is the supreme concept of bourgeois soci-
ety, the concept of police.”4 Given developments in 
the world economic system, the role of Empire in 
the maintenance of the most elaborate global system 
of surveillance ever conceived,5 and the unabated 
growth of public and private security forces in tan-
dem with growing inequality6, Marx’s pronounce-
ments have perhaps never been more salient.
There has, of course, never been a socialist po-
lice science.  The prescriptive formulation of a 
system of social control for most revolutionaries 
is unthinkable, even abhorrent.  As Harvey has 
argued, however, “one of the problems with lately 
lamented communism is that it didn’t ask these 
questions about everyday life.” It did not seriously 
query “what would a transition out of capitalism to 
socialism look like?” which, we would agree, “plays 
a critical role in thinking about any revolutionary 
process.”7 As a consequence, radical democratic 
governments are unprepared to deal with the police 
because they have not applied themselves to a seri-
4  Karl Marx, „On the Jewish Question,“ Pp. 26-52 The Marx-En-
gels Reader, 2d., ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton 
and Company, 1978). 
5  A continuously updated “Global Surveillance Disclosures” 
Wikisite in the aftermath of Edwad Snowden’s NSA document 
leaks may be found here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glob-
al_surveillance_disclosures_%282013%E2%80%93present%29
6  George Rigakos and Aysegul Ergul, „The Pacification of the 
American Working Class: A Longitudinal Study,“ Socialist 
Studies 9.2 (2013): 167-9, George S. Rigakos and Aysegul 
Ergul, „Policing the Industrial Reserve Army: An International 
Study,“ Crime, Law and Social Change 56.4 (2011): 329-71
7 See Harvey’s online lectures on Capital, especially Chapter 15: 
Machinery and Large-Scale Industry, Sections 1-3  
http://davidharvey.org/2008/08/marxs-capital-class-08/
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ous examination of policing and its potential place 
in a new participatory economy.  In the absence of 
such examinations the options for a Left govern-
ments have seemed to cluster around: (i) ever more 
liberal-type reforms of institutions of policing; (ii) 
a clientelist purge and appointment of party-faith-
ful among a new police executive leaving existing 
structures in place, or worse (iii) the complete 
subjugation of state policing in the service of some 
ideologically-driven implementation of an authori-
tarian Left regime. All three of these options should 
be unacceptable to the democratic Left.  They are 
manifestations of an impoverished understanding 
of policing in a capitalist economy and how to go 
about reshaping its institutions.  
The first step for radical Left thinkers, therefore, 
is coming to grips with the intimate connections 
between police and capital in the current system. 
There is a long political and economic history here 
that goes to the heart of the formation and adminis-
tration of the modern liberal state. This bureaucrat-
ic history needs to be unpacked and its mythologies 
examined if the Left is to build a rational democratic 
formation of police and public safety. The point, 
of course, is to change the system. We argue that 
this change is impossible to achieve without a clear 
understanding of the political economy of policing. 
This is the goal of this Report: to lay out how 
policing and capital have functioned in Europe and 
internationally and, based on this understanding, 
to offer some recommendations for discussion for 
democratizing institutions of policing in keeping 
with the political and economic ambitions of the 
democratic Left.
2.0 Police science 
“[a]ll the bourgeois economists are aware…  
that production can be carried on better  
under the modern police...” 
- Karl Marx8 
The Enlightenment period of the late seven-teenth to early nineteenth centuries is often 
considered a period of European ascendance. Eu-
rope blossomed in the midst of devastating state 
wars, colonial exploitation and imperial expansion. 
This era also gave rise to what Foucault termed the 
arrival of “the disciplines” that included modern 
political philosophy, economic theory and inter-
national trade and finance.9  These disciplines laid 
foundations for the economic developments and 
accompanying scientific and political rationalities 
8  A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Chicago: 
C.H. Kerr, 1904):Div. I, part I
9  Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1980)
that are now endemic to contemporary ‘western’ 
civilization.  During this time, important debates 
about the raison d’état, the efficiency of bureaucratic 
systems, and the most economical and ‘scientific’ 
means of governance took place within the rubric of 
a science of police.  
Our approach to “police” in this Report, there-
fore, entails more than just the uniformed law 
enforcement functionaries we have now come to 
identify under that title.  We are intentionally in-
voking a “pre-disciplinary”10 idea of police “before 
the police”11 in order to invoke a longer and more 
embedded interrelationship between police and 
capital.  Such an approach is rare.  Typically, the 
notion of police is presented as a nineteenth cen-
10  Mark Neocleous, „Theoretical Foundations of the „New Police 
Science“,“ Pp. 17-41 The New Police Science: Police Power in Do-
mestic and International Governance, eds. Markus D.  Drubber 
and Mariana Valverde (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2006).  19
11  Lucia Zedner, „Policing before and after the Police: The His-
torical Antecedents of Contemporary Crime Control,“ British 
Journal of Criminology 46.1 (2006): 78-96
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tury project doggedly pursued by forward-thinking 
reformers such as Sir Robert Peel12  or, to a lesser 
extent, as a class-based initiative13 aimed at the 
moral and political control of an increasingly un-
ruly urban proletariat.  There is considerable truth 
to both of these approaches and we are certainly 
very sympathetic to the latter but we also aim to 
demonstrate policing as a grand intellectual project 
linked to state formation, prosperity and security in 
Enlightenment thought.  In order to achieve this, 
therefore, the first order of business is to “[disturb] 
the obviousness of the present of modern western 
policing”.14
To start, the notion of ‘police’ has a peculiar histo-
ry. It can best be understood as an overarching sys-
tem of Enlightenment thought that has given birth 
to a wide range of disciplinary schools ranging from 
political science to economics and criminology.15  It 
is, in a sense, the foundational science of capitalism. 
The earliest planners and political theorists of the 
capitalist system in the seventeenth century were 
directly or indirectly “police intellectuals” in that 
they seamlessly moved from public order and the 
advocacy of systems of social order to methods by 
which the economy could be reshaped to establish 
a capitalist system.16 This planning was simultane-
ously aimed at both imperial and domestic projects 
of pacification that while complex, at core sought to 
make the population “productive” – which meant 
fabricating a social order that facilitated the extrac-
tion of surplus-value from labour. Indeed, Enlight-
enment planners were quite explicit about these 
12  T.A. Critchley, A History of the Police in England and Wales, 
900-1966 (London: Constable Press, 1967)
13  Robert Storch, „The Plague of the Blue Locusts: Police Reform 
and Popular Resistance in Northern England 1840-1857,“ 
International Review of Social History 20 (1975): 61-90
14  Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham, Foucault and Law: Towards a 
Sociology of Law as Governance, Law and Social Theory (Lon-
don: Pluto, 1998), p.128
15  George S. Rigakos, „Beyond Public-Private: Toward a New 
Typology of Policing,“ Pp. 260-319 Re-Imagining Policing in 
Canada, ed. Dennis Cooley (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2005). 
16  Sir William Petty, The Petty Papers: Some Unpublished Writings 
(Vol. 2), ed. Marquis of Lansdowne, vol. 2, 2 vols. (London: 
Constable, 1927, orig. 1660-1669, orig. circa 1690, Joseph von 
Sonnefels, „Grundsätze Der Polizei, Handlung Und Finan-
zwissenschaft,“  (1765, Johann H.G.  von Justi, Grundsätze Der 
Polizeywissenschaft (1756)
projects of pacification and this form of thinking 
continues to inform international “police actions” 
to this very day.17
It is also a peculiarity of this idea of police that 
while it is etymologically rooted in the Greek 
words “polis” and “politeia” (which mean the city 
and civilization) its contemporary use to signify 
an organized body entrusted with enforcing order 
is common to almost all countries except Greece 
itself.  Indeed, most of those who invested in the 
promotion of a police science harkened to its Greek 
roots in what was a common practice of nostal-
gizing the classics and, in particular, the idealized 
Greek city-state during the eighteenth century.  An-
other reason for the direct connection to Hellenic 
antiquity, particularly among the English police 
intellectuals was to gloss over its more developed 
usage on the Continent and, in particular, by the 
French Physiocrats, from whom the English wanted 
to distance themselves but whose ideas about order 
they nonetheless tended to reproduce in their own 
formulations. A complex set of problems that con-
fronted state planners in the transition from feudal 
to capitalist arrangements were conceptualized and 
solved within the language of police science both on 
the Continent and in England as early as the seven-
teenth century.
Etymological considerations, therefore, alert us to 
some important themes of police thinking.  First, 
we need to note the gradual narrowing of the 
concept of police from the seventeenth century 
to the nineteenth century.18  This has had several 
consequences for an understanding of police.  To 
start, many contemporary scholars have uncritically 
accepted liberal definitions of police and ignored 
early mercantilist and cameralist conceptions.  This 
has created disciplinary silos that have downgraded 
‘police science’ from a master discipline aimed at 
the preservation and extension of the means of the 
state to a technical sub-discipline of instrumen-
tal criminology.  Regrettably, police science has 
17  Mike Brogden, „An Act to Colonise the Internal Lands of the 
Island: Empire and the Origins of the Professional Police,“ 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law 15 (1987): 179-20, 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2001)
18  Franz-Ludwig Knemeyer, „Polizei,“ Economy and Society 9.2 
(1980): 172-96
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been “transformed beyond anything recognizable 
to earlier writers on police powers” – it has become 
a “backwater” field19.  Second, English notions of 
police were based on a foreign, Continental ‘other’ 
viewpoint which significantly shaped considera-
tions of the role of police and the legitimacy of the 
state.  In this sense, thinking about ‘what the police 
ought to be’ was also thinking about ‘what the state 
ought to be.’  The project of police, when viewed 
from this etymological perspective, is implicated 
with the project of nation-building since police 
seemed tied to national self-identity and wealth 
creation.  To a great degree, this liberal compul-
sion still haunts national identities today – e.g. the 
westward marching RCMP, the friendly ‘Bobbie’, 
the nation-forging Carabiniere, etc..  Indeed, if and 
when state police monopolies are threatened, new 
calls emerge for their re-consolidations in order to 
defend or re-establish the ‘public good’.20  
The founding political economists of capital and 
the leading police intellectuals who first argued 
for a salaried, centralized and professional police 
all harkened back to the notion of police science. 
There were schools of Polizeiwissenschaft in Ger-
many,21 the seminal Traite du Police in France,22 
and, of course, a ‘political arithmetic’ in England23 
that led to the first pauper police specifically geared 
to managing Britain’s dispossessed after their for-
cible removal from subsistence living. Similar pat-
terns of transition were being experienced across 
19  Neocleous, „Theoretical Foundations of the „New Police Sci-
ence“,“   17
20  Ian Loader and Neil Walker, „Policing as a Public Good: Re-
constituting the Connections between Policing and the State,“ 
Theoretical Criminology 5.1 (2001): 9-35, p.11
21  Albion W. Small, The Cameralists: The Pioneers of German 
Polity (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001, orig. 1909, Sonnefels, 
„Grundsätze Der Polizei, Handlung Und Finanzwissenschaft,“, 
von Justi, Grundsätze Der Polizeywissenschaft 
22  Nicolas de La Mare, Traité De La Police, Où L’on Trouvera 
L’histoire De Son Établissement, Les Fonctions Et Les Préroga-
tives De Ses Magistrats ; Toutes Les Loix Et Tous Les Réglemens 
Qui La Concernent: On Y a Joint Une Description Historique Et 
Topographique De Paris, & Huit Plans Gravez, Qui Representent 
Son Ancien Etat, & Ses Divers Accroissemens, Avec Un Recueil 
De Tous Les Statuts Et Réglemens Des Six Corps Des Marchands, 
& De Toutes Les Communautez Des Arts & Métiers… (Paris: J. 
et P. Cot, 1707)
23  John Graunt and Sir William Petty, Natural and Political Ob-
servations Mentioned in a Following Index, and Made Upon the 
Bills of Mortality (London: Royal Society, 1662)
Europe.24  Thus, to trace the historical development 
of police science is to trace the managerial and intel-
lectual foundations of capitalism. The rise of police 
science in the eighteenth century was an idea that 
included both the thinking and implementation of 
a system necessary for capital accumulation, which 
has long subtended developments in the world eco-
nomic system. 
We can say that these ideas about police and their 
relation to economics may be divided into three 
general schools: 1) Mercantilism, which encouraged 
protectionist economic policy and whose general 
propensity was that of placing capital in the service 
of the sovereign; 2) cameralism, the closest German 
equivalent to mercantilism, which sought to create 
a science of maximizing the collective welfare of all 
through state regulation over, among other aspects, 
trade and commerce, and finally, 3) liberalism, 
which advocated the individual over the collective 
and reversed the logics of mercantilism by placing 
the state in the service of capital.25  These modes 
of economic priority and their relationship to the 
political body were always considered through a 
language of police science and were aimed at the en-
forcement of a transition.  These are not, of course, 
discreet phases of economic thinking for they per-
sist to the present in various forms (from modern 
industrial protectionism in Germany to Keynesian-
ism in England and Austrian liberalism throughout 
the globe) but in considering the specific transition 
from the previous two systems toward the prom-
inence of the third we can better understand the 
modern capitalist policing model and the political 
and economic basis of neoliberal policing today.26
24  Fernand Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life 1400-1800, 
trans. George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd. (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1973)
25  From: George Rigakos, John L. McMullan, Joshua Johnson and 
Gulden Ozcan, eds., A General Police System: Political Economy 
and Security in the Age of Enlightenment (Ottawa: Red Quill 
Books, 2009)
26  see the epochal model by: Steven Spitzer, „The Political Econ-
omy of Policing,“ Pp. 314-41 Crime and Capitalism: Readings 
in Marxist Criminology, ed. David F. Greenberg (Palo Alto: 
Mayfield, 1981). 
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3.0 Capitalist policing
It is admittedly very difficult to establish a single criterion or model for clearly isolating what we 
might now consider general policing activity within 
the broad sweep of human history.  Conducting 
organized patrols, keeping the watch, and generally 
making one’s encampment, fortification or village 
safe from attack and disorder is probably an activity 
as old as human sociality cutting across diverse po-
litical structures and modes of production.27 Nonet-
heless, in terms of a system of thought called ‘police’ 
and a body of officials by the same name, the emer-
gence of a modern form of organized security and 
crime prevention in Europe can be traced back to 
the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century.28 Be-
fore this time, feudal production based on kinship 
in an agrarian system did not require a specialized 
policing system. Value was based on land. Surplus 
was realized locally and enforced domestically and 
imperially by lords and their vassals. Labour was 
largely static and manufactured goods were not ab-
undant which did not necessitate a “general police 
system.”29 
The dissolution of the feudal system and the in-
tense social disorganization that early capitalism 
unleashed created widespread instability and crises 
of order.  This internal instability was coupled with 
a renewed external stability achieved through the 
1648 Peace of Westphalia which ended the Thirty 
Years War and the Eighty Years War and the sign-
ing of the 1659 Treaty of the Pyrenees that ended 
the war between France and Spain.  These treaties 
solidified the notion of state sovereignty and sig-
nalled a European-wide search for a new domestic 
27  Rigakos, „Beyond Public-Private: Toward a New Typology of 
Policing,“  
28  C. Dandeker, Surveillance, Power and Modernity: Bureaucra-
cy and Discipline from 1700 to the Present Day (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1990, Robert Reiner, The Politics of the Police, 2nd 
Edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992, Critch-
ley, A History of the Police in England and Wales, 900-1966, 
Clive Emsley, Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century 
Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)
29  Rigakos, McMullan, Johnson and Ozcan, eds., A General Police 
System: Political Economy and Security in the Age of Enlighten-
ment 
order in the aftermath of incessant warfare.  The 
economic and political needs for stable trade and 
commerce, and for centralized power systems ca-
pable of enabling capitalist growth and imperial 
conquest resulted in new state experiments for ad-
equate systems of order maintenance to guarantee 
prosperity through the maintenance of productive 
workforces – this was, as we have seen, a direct 
impetus for the search for an adequate science of 
police.30 Moreover, this emergence of police science 
coincided with the defining characteristic of the 
Enlightenment period: the birth of the scientific 
method – collecting as much empirical informa-
tion as possible, attending to all constituent parts 
of a whole, and using knowledge to calculate and 
analyze in order to predict events with regularity. 
The birth of “political arithmetic” and the inven-
tion of statistics allowed for the study of the “body 
politic” in the form of “population.”31  Under this 
intellectual re-casting, political subjects were tuned 
into aggregate objects of analysis as an essential step 
in making police science possible – what Foucault 
called bio-power.32 
While the organization of the first bona fide 
modern state police can be traced to Continental 
systems, especially in those in France and Germany, 
we can find no better exemplar of how a truly liberal 
and capitalist model of policing operates than that 
of nineteenth century London, and particularly the 
bodies of police that immediately predated the Met-
ropolitan Police. The 1830 London constabulary of 
Scotland Yard were preceded by an array of private, 
public and quasi-public forms of “monied” police 
30  Mark Neocleous, The Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical 
Theory of Police Power (London: Pluto Press, 2000)
31  Sir William Petty, The Petty Papers: Some Unpublished Writings 
(Vol. 1), ed. Marquis of Lansdowne, vol. 1, 2 vols. (London: 
Constable, 1927, orig. circa 1690, Michel Foucault, „Govern-
mentality,“ Pp. 87-104 The Foucault Effect: Studies in Gov-
ernmentality, eds. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter 
Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
32  Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège 
De France, 1978--1979, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 
2010)
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and notorious “thieftaker”33 privateers not seen in 
other parts of Europe until the more recent rise of 
neoliberalism34 and the dissolution of Soviet state 
capitalism.35  This boom in late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century private policing can be directly 
attributed to London’s slow and reluctant adoption 
of a centralized, public policing system already well 
established in France, Austria and Prussia.  But by 
1800 the Thames River Police, under the direction 
of the famous police intellectual and magistrate 
Patrick Colquhoun began to patrol the docks, quays 
and hulks of London’s shipping artery.  It was a 
private police force under legislative authority, with 
four-fifths of its budget financed by the West India 
merchants.  
The Thames River Police can be viewed as a cap-
italist model of policing par excellence but we must 
also remember that the lineage of police thinking 
that gave birth to this first audacious security exper-
iment is very long and links back to a political econ-
omy that was part of the planning and rationale for 
the emergence of a mercantilist state. Indeed, over 
a century and a half before the emergence of this 
first privately financed, yet legislatively formalized, 
uniformed, salaried, commercial police, Sir William 
Petty was laying out the groundwork for a ‘political 
arithmetic’ that would help change Enlightenment 
thinking about governance. Petty has long been ap-
preciated as the “founder of political economy” and 
the “inventor of statistics”.36  His Natural and Politi-
cal Observations on the Bills on Mortality (attributed 
33  John L. McMullan, „The Political Economy of Thief-Taking,“ 
Crime, Law, and Social Change: An International Journal 23 
(1995): 121-46
34  Volker Eick and Kendra Briken, eds., Urban (in)Security: Po-
licing the Neoliberal Crisis (Ottawa: Red Quill Books, 2014, Les 
Johnston, The Rebirth of Private Policing (London: Routledge, 
1992, Jaap de Waard, „The Private Security Industry in Inter-
national Perspective,“ European Journal on Criminal Policy and 
Research 7 (1999): 143-74
35  Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the 
Making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2002)
36  See the pronouncements made by the Marquis of Lansdowne 
in Sir William Petty, The Petty Papers: Some Unpublished 
Writings (Vol. 1), ed. Marquis of Lansdowne, vol. 1, 2 vols. 
(London: Constable, 1927).
to John Graunt)37 laid the foundation for a new 
system of governmentality that would significantly 
alter how sovereigns viewed their subjects through 
the prism of  ‘populations.’  
Thus, while Petty has been acknowledged for his 
revolutionary contribution to political economy 
among contemporary economists he has received 
scant attention for his contribution to the develop-
ment of ‘police science.’ He understood before most 
that the true source of new wealth of the emerging 
capitalist system would come not from rent and 
property alone but through the circulation of ‘free 
labour’ which would be able to “superlucrate mil-
lions upon millions”38 for the Kingdom. Marx, for 
example, recognized Petty’s “audacious genius”39 
because he understood the mechanics of capital 
long before his contemporaries. Petty also personal-
ly benefitted from his statistical and analytical gifts 
as he was granted sizeable estates including the Irish 
town of Kenmar that he designed using triangular 
patterned roadways bearing his name and title. He 
developed not only the broad project of political 
economy, but also understood that wealth creation 
was dependent on a systematic approach to surveil-
lance and control of populations through account-
ing.  He noted as early as 1690 in his advice to the 
Crown that the Irish simply refused to work more 
than the few hours necessary to secure their own 
sustenance. Since the Irish had access to land and 
because they were able to grow their own food this 
undermined the kingdom’s ability to extract their 
full productive potential. His recommendations in-
cluded forcibly “transporting them and their goods” 
so that the Irish would have little choice other than 
to sell their labour in the factories of England.   The 
expropriation of their land, therefore, was part of 
a civilizing process that would make them closer 
to the English. Of course, more abundant wealth 
could be accrued by ‘freeing’ the Irish labourer 
creating: “…spare Hands enough among the King 
37  Graunt and Petty, Natural and Political Observations Men-
tioned in a Following Index, and Made Upon the Bills of Mortali-
ty 
38  J. Brewer, „Law and Disorder in Stuart and Hanoverian Eng-
land,“ History Today January (1980): 18-27
39  Karl Marx, „Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy 
of Right,“ Pp. 16-25 The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. 
Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1978, orig. 1843).  
App. A fn.2.
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of England’s Subjects, to earn two Millions per an-
num more than they now do; and that there are also 
Employments, ready, proper, and sufficient, for that 
purpose”.40
Sir William Petty’s abilities at surveying and 
urban planning were thus aimed at eliciting the 
maximum level of productivity from subjects of 
the English Crown, including those who lived in 
cities. Not only is this expressed in Petty’s design of 
the Irish town of Kenmar but even more so in his 
detailed plan for the city of London including espe-
cially the erection of an encircling wall. He argued 
that this ‘London wall’ should be “100m foot in cir-
cumference, 11 foot-high, two brick thick, in a for-
tification figure, with 20 gates, worth 20m£…”  But 
what would the purpose of such a wall be? For the 
security of the city?  In part, but this seems only sup-
plementary to its primary function for Petty. Thus, 
the function of the wall was “[t]o take an accompt 
of all persons and things going in and out of the 
Citty” and to provide “[a] foundation of libertyes, 
securityes, and priviledges” which included who 
may be allowed into the city, how their possessions 
should be catalogued, a taxation system, a system of 
management for those who were not productive, a 
licensing system for beggars and so forth. William 
Petty’s London wall is an architectural design that 
goes far beyond bricks and mortar. 
For the first time in recorded history a city wall 
was to be erected not for the purposes of fortifica-
tion and defense but rather as a method of surveil-
lance and for the best means of keeping accounts. 
The gates would be guarded not by sword but by 
pen.41 Metaphorically, therefore, the London wall 
symbolizes the confluence of the project of police 
and capital through the statistical ordering of pop-
ulations, the end purpose of which was to make 
subjects more ‘productive’. Years earlier, Petty im-
agined a much more austere system for delinquents 
and debtors in Ireland, including that “all men be 
bound to keep Accompts of their Receipts and Is-
sues, Gayn and Losse, Debts & Credits, in mony, 
Cattle & Goods, and where they were at noon and 
40  Petty, The Petty Papers: Some Unpublished Writings (Vol. 1)  iv 
41  Juri Mykkänen, „‘To Methodize and Regulate Them‘: William 
Petty‘s Governmental Science of Statistics,“ History of the 
Human Sciences 7 (1994): 65-88
every night every day in the yeare, with mention of 
what deeds here hath made or witnessed”. No house 
would stand alone nor outside the call of some 
other house in order to ensure effective communi-
cation in times of crisis and to allow for a system 
of surveillance and apprehension. Finally, Petty 
proposed in the middle of the 17th century what has 
now become a common refrain among the security 
establishment: a national identification system so 
that “[every] man carry about him an uncounterf-
itable Tickett, expressing his name, the numero of 
his Howse, his Age, Trade, Stature, Haire, eye, and 
other peculiar marks of his Body.”42  Thus, not only 
was Sir William Petty the inventor of statistics, the 
founder of political economy, and early colonial 
surveyor and planner, he was also one of the initial 
architects of capitalism by arguing for the establish-
ment and enforcement of a wage labor system. He 
thus laid the groundwork for the development of 
‘police science’ to follow, very early recognizing not 
only that the new source of wealth under capitalist 
relationships would be ‘free labour’ but simultane-
ously understanding the forms of surveillance and 
pacification necessary to make capitalism function.
While Petty is often recognized for his contribu-
tion to political economy yet largely unappreciated 
for his contribution to police science,43 the reverse is 
true of Patrick Colquhoun. Long recognized as the 
strongest proponent of the ‘new police’ that would 
eventually patrol the streets of London in 1830, 
most police analysts overlook his important contri-
bution to political economy. Before Colquhoun was 
to become famous for advocating a London police 
that was centralized, salaried, and professional he 
was a commercial master in the New England col-
ony of Virginia, specializing in shipping and trade. 
As a loyalist to the Crown he also helped finance 
a Glasgow Regiment sent to put down the emerg-
ing American revolution. Thus, before Colquhoun 
penned his famous Treatise On The Commerce and 
Police of the River Thames44 and his opus Treatise 
42  Petty, The Petty Papers: Some Unpublished Writings (Vol. 1)  
Nos. 10 to 17.
43  except see George S. Rigakos and Richard W. Hadden, „Crime, 
Capitalism and the Risk Society: Towards the Same Olde Mo-
dernity?,“ Theoretical Criminology 5.1 (2001): 61-84
44  Patrick Colquhoun, Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis, Etc. 
(London: Mawman, 1800, orig. 1795)
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on the Police of the Metropolis45 he was compiling 
one of the most comprehensive statistical overviews 
of the resources of the British empire. Like Sir 
William Petty before him, Colquhoun understood 
in his catalogue of the British Empire’s holdings 
that “[the] resources of nations are derived from 
the productive labour of the people” and that this 
labour “is augmented or diminished according to 
forms of government, and the intelligence, ability 
and zeal… in those to whom it is assigned to direct 
the state of affairs of states and empires”.46 Petty 
experimented with the Irish, Colquhoun with the 
Virginians. Both, however, subsequently proposed 
policing projects domestically, aimed at the ‘indi-
gent poor’, the criminal classes and eventually the 
entire English working class.
The police role in enforcing a class-based struc-
ture of economic prosperity had been central to 
Colquhoun’s thinking. Colquhoun argued that the 
port of London stood to loose upwards of 60 million 
pounds while maintaining his police would cost 
only a fraction of that amount.  His understanding 
of police extended ‘security to Commercial Proper-
ty’, where he claimed that “the privileges of inno-
cence will be preserved, and the comforts of Civil 
society eminently enlarged”.47 
Colquhoun’s class politics were especially obvious 
in his work for the Thames shippers and London 
merchants where he set about instituting a system 
of surveillance that eliminated customary compen-
sation outside official lumping rates (wages).  He 
argued for “the abolition of the perquisite of chips”, 
including “sweepings”, “samplings”48 and “the abo-
lition of fees and perquisites of every description” 
in favour of “a liberal increase in salaries”.49 This 
form of cost rationalization is thus a harbinger of 
Fordism to come over a century later. A predictable 
system of compensation had to be enforced in order 
45   Colquhoun, Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis, Etc. 
46  Patrick Colquhoun, A Treatise on the Wealth, Power, and Re-
sources of the British Empire (London: Joseph Mawman, 1814), 
p.49
47  Patrick Colquhoun, A Treatise on the Commerce and Police of 
the River Thames (London: Joseph Mawman, 1800), p. 38.
48  Colquhoun, A Treatise on the Commerce and Police of the River 
Thames , p. 138.
49  Colquhoun, Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis, Etc. ., p. 
355.
to guarantee profits which meant that pre-capitalist 
practices like owning a piece of the fruits of one’s la-
bour had to be eliminated. Of course, Colquhoun’s 
initiatives did not go unopposed. Pacification ex-
pects resistance50 and so the Thames River police 
office was ransacked by rioting workers. Colquhoun 
nonetheless persisted and, in the long run, reported 
that his new system of police had saved the river’s 
commercial interests over 122£ million.
It is important to appreciate that Colquhoun 
skillfully created and enforced a wage labour system 
at the precise time and place where international 
capitalism demanded it most – the heart of Imperial 
England.  The lumping rates were arrived at so that 
“honest labour can be procured for daily wages” and 
so that lumpers would not resort to ‘plunder’.51 Rates 
were publicly posted at the Thames Police office. 
Master lumpers (dock foremen) were scrutinized 
by the police; clothing used to conceal customs and 
payments in kind such as wide trousers, jemmies, 
and concealed pockets were banned; lumpers were 
searched; all ships, contents and manifests regis-
tered and their contents guarded.  Colquhoun’s 
‘police machine’52 was directed specifically at class 
discipline by uplifting the indigent poor and fabri-
cating the working conditions of the ‘useful’ poor. 
He believed that “by this… a confidence is to be es-
tablished… the improvement of public morals will 
contribute, in an eminent degree, to the happiness 
and prosperity of the country”.53 The purpose of 
this police machine was clear: “to extend the scope 
of productive labour”54 if not directly in the produc-
tion of goods then certainly in intensifying exploita-
50  Rigakos, George. “”To Extend the Scope of Productive 
Labour:” Pacification as a Police Project.” Anti-Security. Eds. 
Rigakos, George and Mark Neocleous. Ottawa: Red Quill 
Books, 2011. 57-83.
51  Colquhoun, A Treatise on the Commerce and Police of the River 
Thames , p. 619.
52  John L. McMullan, „Social Surveillance and the Rise of the 
‚Police Machine‘,“ Theoretical Criminology 2.1 (1998): 93-117
53  Colquhoun, A Treatise on the Commerce and Police of the River 
Thames 
54  Colquhoun, A Treatise on the Wealth, Power, and Resources of 
the British Empire  232
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tion in the circuit of capital through the transport of 
commodities at the docks.55
Contemporary empirical research has revealed a 
continued correlation between worker exploitation, 
household inequality and more policing, both in-
ternationally and in the United States over time.56 
These relationships persist even in divergent legal 
and political contexts with significant variations 
in institutional histories of policing.  It seems that 
55  For Marx, the system of distribution falls under Department 
II which means that no surplus value is realized at the point of 
sale since no additional value has been added by the retailer.  
Nonetheless, the transport industry was an exception to this for 
Marx as the movement of goods which included the expendi-
ture of resources and labour to make commodities available for 
consumption certainly added to the exchange value of goods, 
making those working in the transport industry “productive.”
56  Rigakos and Ergul, „The Pacification of the American Working 
Class: A Longitudinal Study,“, Rigakos and Ergul, „Policing the 
Industrial Reserve Army: An International Study,“ 
the more unequal a society, the more exploited 
the workers, the more dependent that society is on 
policing. More aptly put, the more insecure that 
ruling elites become, the more dependent they are 
on policing, both public and private.   The histor-
ical development of police science as a system of 
thought, the first deployment of a capitalist police 
models and the continued resilience and growth of 
this model amid crises of capitalism demonstrate 
the close relationship between policing and the con-
temporary global economic system.
The interrelationships imagined by early police 
scientists on the Continent and England between 
police science and capital accumulation have re-
mained largely intact.  Indeed, the imperial nature 
of security has only accelerated after the events of 
September 11, 2001, legitimating a renewed expan-
sion of the security-industrial complex. This ampli-
fication of risk mitigation, more security thinking 
and expenditures was well underway before 9/11. 
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4.0 Security as hegemony
These are difficult times to be opposed to the global economic system.  Capitalism has osten-
sibly survived another crisis for which the long-term 
repercussions and the potential for another abrupt 
decline are still looming.57  In light of this apparent 
resilient fragility and the apparent absence of a ready 
alternative, neoliberalism has ideologically reasser-
ted itself, doubling down through austerity58 and 
the ramping up of an ever more bloated security-in-
dustrial complex.59  The answer to this insecurity is 
again more security which is always by definition 
insecure.60 This cycle of risk mitigation with its ideo-
logical “bottomless barrel of demands”61 has myriad 
consequences for the environment,62 the economy,63 
57  Ernest Mandel, Long Waves of Capitalist Development: A 
Marxist Interpretation (London: Verso, 1995, orig. 1980, orig. 
1980, Leo Panitch, Greg  Albo and Vivek Chibber, eds., The 
Crisis and the Left: Socialist Register 2012 (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 2012)
58  Tim Fowler, ed., From Crisis to Austerity: Neoliberalism, 
Organized Labour and the Canadian State (Ottawa: Red Quill 
Books, 2013, Carlo Fanelli, Chris  Hurl, Priscillia Lefebvre and 
Gülden Özcan, eds., Saving Global Capitalism: Interrogating 
Austerity and Working Class Responses to Crises (Ottawa: Red 
Quill Books, 2010)
59  Rigakos and Ergul, „The Pacification of the American Working 
Class: A Longitudinal Study,“, Rigakos and Ergul, „Policing the 
Industrial Reserve Army: An International Study,“, Peter B. 
Kraska and Victor E. Kappeler, „Militarizing American Police: 
The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units,“ Social 
Problems 44.1 (1997): 1-18
60  Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cam-
bridge: Polity Press, 1990)1990
61  Gabe Mythen, „Employment, Individualization and Insecuri-
ty: Rethinking the Risk Society Perspective,“ The Sociological 
Review 53.1 (2005): 129-49
62  Ulrich Beck, „Modern Society as a Risk Society,“ Pp. 199-214 
The Culture and Power of Knowledge, eds. N. Stehr and Richard 
V. Ericson (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1992), Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: 
Towards a New Modernity, trans. Mark Ritter (London: Sage, 
1992)
63  Aaron Doyle and Richard Ericson, Uncertain Business: Risk, 
Insurance and the Limits of Knowledge (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2004, Ulrich Beck, „A Risky Business,“ L.S.E. 
Magazine 199, Uwe Engel and Hermann Strasser, „Global Risks 
and Social Inequality: Critical Remarks on the Risk-Society 
Hypothesis,“ Canadian Journal of Sociology 23.1 (1998): 91-103
popular culture,64 the judiciary,65 and the police.66 
Institutional threats are increasingly viewed through 
the lens of security; social problems become reima-
gined as security concerns; and economic instability 
and poverty are, of course, security threats. The 
supremacy of security has resulted in an analytic 
blockage.67 So much so that it can be said that today 
“security is hegemony.”68 
This raises significant challenges for any radical 
politics, especially from the Left. Indeed, it plac-
es any opposition to this global security super-
structure, ideologically buttressed and significantly 
ramped up after 9/11, in a direct antagonistic rela-
tionship with Empire and its international system of 
police.69 Of course, this tension is hardly new but it 
has perhaps now more than ever reached the point 
where security has become not only the “supreme 
concept of bourgeois society” as Marx put it in the 
nineteenth century but the predominant mobilizing 
concern for both production and consumption. 
Security not only rationalizes the entire system of 
pacification legislatively and juridically but security 
is embedded in the circulation of goods that define 
us as individuals.  
It is this basic understanding of security and its 
role within all aspects of the circuit of capitalist 
production that we must first understand if there is 
to be an effective socialist police science as an alter-
native. We should understand this hegemony to be 
64  Frank Furedi, Culture of Fear: Risk Taking and the Morality of 
Low Expectation (Harrison PA: Continuum Publications, 1997)
65  George L. Priest, „The New Legal Structure of Risk Control,“ 
Daedulus 119 (1990): 207-27
66  Richard V. Ericson and Kevin D. Haggerty, Policing the Risk 
Society (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997)
67  Mark Neocleous and George S. Rigakos „Anti-Security: A 
Declaration,“ Pp. 15-21 Anti-Security (Ottawa: Red Quill 
Books, 2011). 
68  George Rigakos, „“To Extend the Scope of Productive La-
bour:“ Pacification as a Police Project,“ Pp. 57-83 Anti-Security, 
eds. George Rigakos and Mark Neocleous (Ottawa: Red Quill 
Books, 2011), George Rigakos and Martin Manolov, „Anti-Se-
curity: Q and a Interview,“ Annual Review of Interdisciplinary 
Justice Research 12 (2012): 9-26
69  Hardt and Negri, Empire 
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the aggregate effect of alienation.70 This alienation, 
in turn, is the ideological and cultural manifestation 
of commodity fetishism that stems from workers 
being divorced from the fruits of their own labour 
and from how other commodities are produced – 
otherwise understood as the mystification of pro-
duction and consumption.  Most of us are keenly 
aware that we are living in an era that is defined 
by consumption and that this consumption helps 
make up our identities.71 Of course, the effect here 
is that the ubiquity of security and risk management 
means that the entire production and consumption 
process is saturated with security considerations72 
that seem aesthetic. Places of consumption must 
seem like safe places to shop: places where “our type 
of people” venture. Increasingly, societies are based 
around consumption practices that are structured 
by security logics. Ideologically, whether at the na-
tional, international or local level, security in this 
context must be said to be hegemonic.73
Against this hegemony a new understanding of 
security must be built that represents nothing less 
than a police system that facilitates a transition to 
a new democratic economic order in the same way 
that police science fabricated a new order for feu-
dalism’s transition into capitalism in the eighteenth 
century.
70  Ernest. Mandel and George Edward Novack, The Marxist 
Theory of Alienation: Three Essays (New York: Pathfinder Press, 
1970)
71  Jean Baudrillard, The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures, 
trans. Chris Turner (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998, orig. 1970)
72  These security considerations are as macroeconomic as secur-
ing supply routes, securing oil fields, securing trade markets, 
etc. and as microeconomic as building in product security at 
the design level to offset the potential for litigation, selling 
the aesthetic of security and safety as part of the enticement 
to buy the product in marketing campaigns, creating product 
guarantees and establishing industry security ratings like five-
star safety ratings and so forth. These security considerations 
extend to consumption as well. It envelops the entire circuit 
of capital. Areas of consumption such as malls and Business 
Improvement Districts, for example, are quite obsessed with 
security.
73  Rigakos, „“To Extend the Scope of Productive Labour:“ Pacifi-
cation as a Police Project,“ , Rigakos and Manolov, „Anti-Secu-
rity: Q and a Interview,“ 
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5.0 A Left approach towards the police
Our approach to democratizing the police is inevitably coloured by what we think the 
police can potentially become – our political prob-
lematique. These possibilities in turn are a product 
of how we see both the institutions of policing and 
the knowledge system of police science operating in 
capitalism.  We have argued that the police are a not 
a passive institution of capitalist formation but an 
active locus through which police science concocted 
schemes for building a capitalist order and then set 
about enforcing these relationships – the fabrication 
of social order.74 This system is tied to the bourgeois 
project of pacification75 which centrally includes 
making populations ‘productive’: that is, exploiting 
workers in order to extract surplus and enforcing 
property relations that subtend the mode of produc-
tion. We have also argued that while the police ope-
rate within a wide range of organizational structures 
there is nonetheless “a general police system” and a 
capitalist policing model that has been ideologically 
amplified by neoliberalism both across Europe and 
in Greece.  This model is ubiquitous, straddling both 
public and private forms76 and operating within a 
broad hegemony of security.
5.1 A Left politics of policing
Let us first start with the basic principle that a 
Left approach to understanding and reforming the 
police must include a coming to terms with the fact 
that the police can no longer be treated as the enemy. 
The public police must now be appreciated as noth-
ing more than a vehicle for establishing and enforc-
ing a social order that while institutionally aligned 
74  Neocleous, The Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical Theory of 
Police Power 
75  Mark Neocleous, George S.  Rigakos and Tyler  Wall „On 
Pacification: Introduction to the Special Issue,“ Socialist Studies 
9.2 (2013): 1-6
76  Johnston, The Rebirth of Private Policing, Rigakos, „Beyond 
Public-Private: Toward a New Typology of Policing,“ , Nigel 
South, „Private Security, the Division of Policing Labor and 
the Commercial Compromise of the State,“ Research in Law, 
Deviance and Social Control 6 (1984): 171-98
with the interests of the capitalist state today77 are 
not necessarily endemic to it.  Second, it must also 
be accepted that there will always be a form of what 
we now understand as policing “after the revolu-
tion”—no matter how far-reaching this revolution 
is imagined to be—given the development of the di-
vision of labour in advanced European economies.78 
It is therefore incumbent on the democratic Left to 
seriously consider the role and organization of the 
police in a system where the mode of production is 
supposed to be transitioning from capitalism.  
Police institutions are not easy to transform but 
they are not monolithic either.79  There is often 
dissent within the ranks and various practices and 
deployments are often criticized by line officers. As 
in all complex organizations, there are political rup-
tures throughout. There are examples of the police 
defying the orders of authoritarian capitalism in-
cluding refusing to board rail cars to smash strikes,80 
aligning with the interests of a particular caste of 
workers to fight off scabs81 or even joining a Gener-
al Strike82 on the side of workers. Indeed, the local 
police often proved so unreliable as strike breakers 
during North America’s early industrial era that 
perhaps the most significant development in police 
transformation reflected the need to create detached 
and easily mobilized state, federal or private police83 
77  Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism 
78  Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, trans. W. D.  
Halls (New York: Free Press, 1967)
79  Janet Chan, Changing Police Culture: Policing in a Multicultural 
Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
80  S.R. Couch, „Selling and Reclaiming State Sovereignty: The 
Case of the Coal and Iron Police,“ Insurgent Sociologist 10.4 & 
11 (1981): 1, 85-9, Robert Weiss, „The Emergence and Trans-
formation of Private Detective Industrial Policing in the United 
States, 1850-1940,“ Crime & Social Justice 9 (1978): 35-48
81  Bruce C. Johnson, „Taking Care of Labor: The Police in Ameri-
can Politics,“ Theory and Society 3 (1976): 89-117
82  Lorne Brown and Caroline Brown, An Unauthorized History 
of the Rcmp (2ed.) (Toronto: Lewis and Samuel, 1978, Reinhold 
Kramer and Tom Mitchell, When the State Trembled: How 
A.J. Andrews and the Citizens’ Committee Broke the Winnipeg 
General Strike (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010)
83  Frank Morn, The Eye That Never Sleeps (Rochester: University 
of Rochester Press, 1998)
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to quash local unrest in lieu of the military – the 
implications of which were well understood by the 
labour movement of the early twentieth century.84
The policing of protest today, of course, has be-
come a science unto itself and while it is, on the 
whole, less lethal than it was in the past,85 it has 
become far more obviously militarized,86 insidious87 
and wide-ranging, casting a fine net over activ-
ists and protesters and radically expanding intelli-
gence-gathering and surveillance before and after 
ceremonial gatherings of corporate and state elites, 
especially at Summits.88  The Left ought not to be 
surprised by any of these politics.  Police agencies 
of different types have performed as functionaries 
of order enforcement for a wide gamut of political 
regimes.  Closest to home and in recent history, 
when East and West Germany were unified after 
1989 their respective East and West Berlin police 
shared patrol cars in an attempt to bureaucratically 
and culturally unify the agencies.  A timely anthro-
pological backseat account of these patrol car in-
teractions produced a chronicle of the clash of two 
ideologies directly affecting police decision-making. 
On the job debates ensued as, in one case, an East 
Berlin police officer chastized his West Berlin police 
partner for selectively harassing destitute-looking 
Germans.89 East German police were also astounded 
that West German police refused to wear their uni-
forms to and from work as if they were ashamed to 
be police officers.  They wondered what they had to 
84  Kenneth H. Bechtel, State Police in the United States: A Socio-
historical Analysis (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995)
85  Notwithstanding, more recently, the police killings of Carlo 
Giuliani in Genoa in 2001, Alexandros Grigoropoulos in Ath-
ens in 2008, and Ian Tomlinson in London in 2009.
86  Kraska and Kappeler, „Militarizing American Police: The Rise 
and Normalization of Paramilitary Units,“ 
87  Rob Evans and Paul Lewis, Undercover: The True Story of 
Britain’s Secret Police (London: Guardian Books, 2014)
88  Willem De Lint and Alan Hall, Intelligent Control: Develop-
ments in Public Order Policing in Canada (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2009, Lamb and Rigakos, „Pacification 
through ‚Intelligence‘ During the Toronto G20,“ , Fernandez, 
Policing Dissent: Social Control and the Anti-Globalization 
Movement, Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle, „Globalization 
and the Policing of Protest: The Case of Apec 1997,“ British 
Journal of Sociology 50 (1999): 587-60, Evans and Lewis, Under-
cover: The True Story of Britain’s Secret Police 
89  Andreas Glaeser, Divided in Unity: Identity, Germany, and the 
Berlin Police (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000)
be ashamed of. These types of disagreements among 
police rarely surface publicly because it could un-
dermine the legal position of officers at trial and 
undercut the fraternal esprit des corps. which is a 
requisite part of the mythology of policing.90
Despite these cleavages, we must nonetheless 
concede that short of corporate boardrooms, foot-
ball booster clubs, and monarchist leagues there 
are few more conservative associations than police 
unions.91  But perhaps this is also a product of their 
isolation from the broader workers’ movements, 
both self-imposed but often also foisted upon them. 
Perhaps it is a reflection of their position of guard-
ians of public order that they are inevitably forced 
to physically clash with contemporary social move-
ments. Of course, there is a particular suspicion 
about police unions amongst the Left.  The belief is 
that they are inherently reactionary, unsympathetic 
and antithetical to the Left’s mission.  This state of 
affairs cannot be allowed to continue.  
Marx and Marxists have long conceded that un-
ions are inherently problematic for the Left in any 
case92 but leaving police unions in isolation means 
never having a conversation about the police officer 
as a worker and thus never initiating a bona fide 
reflection about the authority of the police line of-
ficer to affect change in their own institution and to 
do so with the support of the Left.  In the absence 
of such an identification, the police line officer is 
90  John Van Maanen, „Kinsmen in Repose: Occuptional Per-
spectives of Patrolmen,“ Pp.  Policing: A View from the Street, 
eds. Peter K. Manning and John Van Maanen (Santa Monica, 
CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1978), Reiner, The Politics of the 
Police, 2nd Edition, John P. Crank, Understanding Police Culture 
(Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing, 1998, Jerome Skolnick, 
Justice without Trial (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1966)
91  Although even here there are interesting ruptures forming.  
The Ontario Provincial Police Union (the union representating 
the Province of Ontario’s police service) recently ran a very 
public ad campaign during the 2014 provincial election in 
opposition to proposed austerity measures by the Conserv-
ative Party. See: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/
ontario-votes-2014/ontario-election-2014-opp-officers-union-
launches-anti-hudak-ads-1.2661984
92  By 1872, Marx complained in his speech to the General 
Council of the International Workers’ Association that “[t]rade 
unions are praised too much; they must in the future be treated 
as affiliated societies and used as centers of attack in the strug-
gle of labour against capital.” Karl Marx, „On Wages, Hours, 
and the Trade-Union Struggle,“ Pp. 90-93 Marx and Engels on 
the Trade Unions, ed. K. Lapides (New York: Praeger, 1987). 
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left little choice but to ideologically (and sometimes 
physically) ally with whatever constituency shows 
its support – even Fascist elements.  It should come 
as no surprise, therefore, that the most ideologically 
right-wing regime of the last four decades—the 
Thatcher government—set about providing the 
English police huge contractual concessions almost 
as soon as it came to office in exchange for their 
support in crushing unions throughout the country 
including especially the miner’s strike of 1984–85.93 
This pact between the Right and police has histor-
ically been neoconservative in nature, which differs 
from its newer neoliberal manifestation.94  The 
neoliberal orientation, in the parlance of Austrian 
economics, is quite uncomfortable with accepting 
government alliances with public sector institutions 
looking for “rent-seeking” agreements.  Under such 
thinking, even public policing ought to be subject 
to market forces95 and should not have a monopoly 
over public safety which brings the historic alliance 
between the Right and the police into an interesting 
period of flux. There is an opportunity, therefore, to 
undercut the historic alliance between the Right and 
police by seizing upon the police front line officer 
as worker—who works in an intensely stressful job 
with little respite and recourse to outside supports96 
and deeply dependent on police executive deci-
sion-making.
There is some narrative building that must be 
developed here in order to forge such an alliance 
but there are ample stories of police solidarity with 
workers throughout the Western world.  In some 
countries, like Greece, the distance between police 
and the Left seems historically entrenched in the 
Cold-War politics of regional stabilization leading 
to a Civil War period and junta creating even starker 
93  The historic Tory-police union pact in the UK appears to be 
problematized recently as neoliberalism has begun to trump 
neconservatism among the right: http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/may/21/theresa-may-ripped-up-tory-
pact-police-thatcher 
94  Nikolas Rose, „Governing ‚Advanced‘ Liberal Democracies,“ 
Pp. 37-64 Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Lib-
eralism and Rationalities of Government, eds. Anrew Barry, 
Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose (London: UCL Press, 
1996). 
95  See the account of libertarian notions of police in: Johnston, 
The Rebirth of Private Policing 
96  Crank, Understanding Police Culture 
divisions.97  But these tensions must now necessarily 
be viewed as antiquated and a democratic Left must 
overcome them in forging a new state organization. 
Alliances with the police are important for the suc-
cess of any political order and this begins at the both 
the top and the bottom of the police organization.
5.2 Policing as labour 
Police officers are workers.  They may be said to 
be reproducers98 or even fabricators99 of a social or-
der conducive to capital accumulation – this much 
is true. But there are also a wide assortment of occu-
pations in late capitalism that are just as important 
to its survival ranging from insurance100 to world 
finance.101   In the eyes of capitalism, the public 
police, like the public service sector generally, are 
also unproductive workers in that they produce no 
vendible commodity and no surplus-value.102  This 
is why the largest threat to the monopoly of public 
policing, in its purest sense, comes from neoliberal-
ism which advocates for private security103 and the 
security technology industry where security labour 
can be economically exploited and/or replaced by 
the production of vendible security products that 
97  George S. Rigakos and Georgios  Papanicolau, „The Political 
Economy of Greek Policing: Between Neo-Liberalism and the 
Sovereign State,“ Policing and Society 13.3 (2003): 271-304
98  Richard V. Ericson, Reproducing Order (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1982)
99  Neocleous, The Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical Theory of 
Police Power 
100  Doyle and Ericson, Uncertain Business: Risk, Insurance and the 
Limits of Knowledge 
101  Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press and Edition de la Maison 
de l‘Homme, 1979)
102  George S. Rigakos, The New Parapolice: Risk Markets and 
Commodified Social Control (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2002, Stephen Spitzer, „Security and Control in Capitalist 
Societies: The Fetishism of Security and the Secret Thereof,“ 
Pp. 43-58 Transcarceration: Essays in the Sociology of Social 
Control, eds. John Lowman, Robert J. Menzies and Ted S. Palys, 
Cambridge Studies in Criminology (Aldershot: Gower, 1987). 
103  George S. Rigakos, „Policing the Nightclub: Surveillance, 
Consumption and Social Order in a Risk Market,“ Canadian 
Review of Policing Research 1 (2004): 54-60
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create surplus-value such as CCTV.104 The police 
must be made to realize the irony of their alliance in 
upholding a politics that under neoliberalism today 
most directly threatens their existence because of its 
general rejection of the ‘public good.’
The defense of public policing is a rather un-
comfortable position for the Left and usually an 
ideological dead-end because it reifies a dichotomy 
(public versus private) that liberalism has histori-
cally used to justify all sorts of violence.105 Yet if one 
looks at the organization of policing on the whole, 
one sees the rapid rise of private policing and the 
security technology industry in tandem with the 
increasing insecurity of policing labour.  Moreo-
ver, if we understand that the primary function of 
policing under capitalism has been the protection 
of property relations, one must ask what happens 
to monitoring and oversight of the excesses of such 
a protection when policing responsibility has been 
shifted increasingly to private agents with little or 
no pretense or regard for the “public good” and 
beholden to no one other than their corporate mas-
ters?  The public-private dichotomy is a fool’s game 
in policing which is why the Left must approach the 
restructuring of policing labour in all its forms.
In this way, even the private security guard must 
be appreciated as alienated labour par excellence un-
der late capitalism.  This is a worker who is almost 
never unionized, works unnatural hours, usually for 
little pay and on an hourly basis and who is always 
in danger of physical attack.106  Indeed, on an ide-
ological level you would be hard-pressed to find a 
more alienated worker—someone who is ill trained, 
bedecked with a corporate logo to signify that s/he 
is a product, in constant threat of being replaced 
by security technology and asked to engage in what 
104  George S. Rigakos, „Hyperpanoptics as Commodity: The Case 
of the Parapolice,“ Canadian Journal of Sociology 23.1 (1999): 
381-40, George S. Rigakos, „The Significance of Economic 
Trends for the Future of Police and Security,“ Pp. 176-79 Police 
and Security: What the Future Holds, ed. Jane Richardson 
(Ottawa: Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, 2000). 
105  Couch, „Selling and Reclaiming State Sovereignty: The Case of 
the Coal and Iron Police,“, Neocleous and Rigakos „Anti-Securi-
ty: A Declaration,“ , Rigakos, „Beyond Public-Private: Toward a 
New Typology of Policing,“  
106  Mark Button, Security Officers and Policing: Powers, Culture 
and Control in the Governance of Private Space (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2007)
should otherwise be appreciated as the natural and 
communal act of ensuring public safety.  Instead, 
security guards protects property not their own, 
their family’s nor anyone they likely know usually 
at the behest of a foreign corporate owner contract-
ed to a landlord who likely exploits his friends and 
neighbours.  This is a deeply alienated existence for 
any security worker who stops to contemplate their 
situation and certainly an opening for the Left to 
interrogate.  Understanding the security guard as 
a worker just like the police officer is imperative to 
building a strategy for the Left.
5.3 Democratic control
There is an English liberal sentiment about the 
police that continues to circulate and is probably 
more myth than reality.  Perhaps more accurately, 
it speaks to a nostalgia about the modern police 
first invoked as the Metropolitan police mustered 
at Scotland Yard in 1830.  Known as Peel’s central 
principle107 and named after the Home Office Min-
ister who championed the first modern police it 
states:  “The police are the public and the public are 
the police.”  It should not be overlooked that this 
principle108 was being invoked just at the moment 
when the old feudal system of social control had 
been systematically replaced by a centralized, sala-
ried and specialized force made necessary to safe-
guard and promulgate a new economic and social 
order.109 It replaced a voluntary, uncompensated 
and duty-bound system tied to manorial protection 
by the peasantry tied to land – a system remarkably 
common among other agrarian, monarchical socie-
ties.110 The idea that the police and the public were 
one in the same was being conjured at the precise 
moment when the police and the public were, in 
fact, no longer the same at all and more accurately 
marks a milestone when the state became increas-
ingly insecure about legitimizing and enforcing a 
107  C. Reith, The Police and the Democratic Ideal (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1943)
108  There are nine in total.  See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peel-
ian_Principles
109  McMullan, „Social Surveillance and the Rise of the ‘Police 
Machine’,“ 
110  Spitzer, „The Political Economy of Policing,“  
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new, unjust economic formation—the new insecu-
rity of capitalist property relations.111
The democratization of policing, therefore, should 
be understood as far more than simply accommo-
dating “public input”, facilitating adequate civilian 
oversight and even directly electing some police 
leaders.112 These are laudable liberal initiatives that 
must not be abandoned by the Left but they do not 
achieve a truly democratized policing model.  Such 
a model would have to contemplate facilitating 
internal democratic control among the police mem-
bership and even the ability of police officers and se-
curity guards to appeal to civilian bodies for redress 
against their masters.  Policing workers, like other 
workers, must be empowered and protected by the 
Left and in order for them to begin to self-identify 
with the Left’s.  Civilian control and oversight must 
come to be seen as a protection and a service to po-
licing workers and not just a committee of critical 
reviewers.
Policing also cannot be democratized if, as in the 
case of private security, it is specifically organized 
around a corporate structure that simply replicates 
existing modes of capitalist exploitation.  We have 
made it clear that structures of policing are intimate-
ly bound up with the fabrication of capitalism (the 
police-capital connection) and that police science 
can be seen as capitalist science and the foundation 
of modern disciplinary sciences.   Any attempted 
change from the current system of policing without 
simultaneously challenging its political economy 
misses the point of a democratic Left alternative.
The Left must seek to undermine the replication 
and preservation of private capital facilitated by 
the neoliberal divestment of state authority to pri-
vate agents and instead should seek the promotion 
of alternative business structures that promote 
the public good.  To date, there are no recorded 
instances of worker-cooperative private security 
111  Neocleous, „Theoretical Foundations of the „New Police Sci-
ence“,“  
112  As is now the case in some jurisdictions in the United States 
and contemplated for UK police commissioners (see Appen-
dix).
firms.113  There is no reason why a democratic 
Left government cannot give primacy to contract 
security provision of state facilities to such work-
er-owned democratic firms thus giving birth to a 
new, nimble and competitive business entity that 
undercuts the entire model of capitalist policing and 
surplus-value in the process.114 Both ideologically 
and structurally this will have a significant impact 
on the industry. Public tender contracts for security 
services are a large share of the market and could 
have a substantial effect on what is otherwise a 
high-turnover, low-income and alienating position. 
Many of the expensive but relatively simple guard 
functions now undertaken by the state police could 
easily be transferred to worker-cooperative security 
companies that have democratic ownership and no 
need for unions.
Of course, the more concrete, long-term eco-
nomic and ideological intervention for the Left  is 
to make use of part-time and voluntary policing 
bodies as part of the network of state policing pro-
vision.  The best way to ensure civilian sensibilities 
and a democratic understanding of police work is 
to divest its culture and bureaucracy from an iso-
lationist notion and build a working solidarity with 
non-career police personnel who do police work as 
part of their national sense of service.   This is where 
there will likely be significant push-back from state 
police unions but there is no reason why part-time 
and voluntary police cannot be included into the 
union structure.  In fact, this is preferable as it will 
significantly alter the political conservatism and 
democratic functioning of such organizations. The 
Left must insist on the significant democratization 
of these union organizations in order to make alter-
native and progressive voices heard within police 
associations.
Finally, if the Left is to be serious about the inter-
relationship between the public and private policing 
113  There are some examples of “non-profit” security entities in 
Germany but these agencies are not democartically owned by 
the worker’s themselves and their labour is still precarious.  In a 
sense the lumpen are asked to police the lumpen in state-sup-
ported urban policing welfare programs.  See: Volker Eick, 
„New Strategies of Policing the Poor: Berlin‘s Neo-Liberal Se-
curity System,“ Policing and Society 13.4 (2003): 365-7, Volker 
Eick, „Preventive Urban Discipline: Rent-a-Cops and Neoliber-
al Glocalization in Germany,“ Social Justics 33.3 (2006): 1-19
114  Security contracts are typically exempt 
DEMOCRATIZING THE POLICE IN EUROPE – WITH A PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON GREECE 24
functions and the oversight and permeability of 
policing structures, democratization of the police 
will also require the establishment of democratically 
elected police boards at the local or regional levels 
to oversee the myriad of policing provision taking 
place there.  These boards must have say over the 
local police executive, must have democratic con-
trol over a budget for the allocation of resources 
to alternative policing entities including part-time, 
auxiliary, and worker-coop security services.  The 
budget for security provision must be democratized 
so that local police board members can make deci-
sions about security provision that best suits their 
needs.115  All of this, however, needs to take place 
within a firm set of guidelines that eliminates the 
tendency toward demagoguery and the targeting of 
particular populations – a potential threat that can 
be eliminated within a regulative structure and ade-
quate mission statement for such boards.
With these key approaches in mind, we turn to 
addressing how these principles might manifest 
themselves more directly as part of a platform for 
action by the Left.
115  Such initiatives may not be as radical as they seem.  Similar 
plans have been proposed for Canada, see: George S. Rigakos, 
In Search of Security: The Roles of Public and Private Agencies 
(Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 2002) and Northern 
Ireland: Independent Commission on Policing for Northern 
Ireland, A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland (Aka the 
Patten Report). (Belfast: Independent Commission on Policing 
for Northern Ireland, 1999).
6.0 A platform for action
The preceding sections have outlined the set of structural, historical and practical factors that 
a democratic Left programme for policing must 
acknowledge, confront and overcome. To be sure, 
the theoretical fact that the police function and the 
ideology of security is deeply intertwined with the 
very process of capitalist reproduction may repre-
sent an absolute limit for reforming the police in 
capitalist society. Nevertheless, the set of historical 
and practical factors leading to the entrenchment of 
the police within a particular institutional role and 
within particular organisational forms under con-
ditions of liberal democracy should be understood 
as posing a series of barriers rather than limits. This 
means that there is a genuine margin for reform 
along the lines of a democratic Left vision of the 
police prioritising security as a public good and 
fostering social fairness, integrity and democratic 
control. 
As we have articulated above, the Left’s platform 
for action on policing ought to proceed within an 
approach that prioritizes: (i) the politics of policing; 
(ii) policing as labour; and (iii) the need to establish 
strong mechanisms of democratic control.  With this 
general approach in mind the Left should consider 
the following tenets in forming a more specific plat-
form of action: 
•	Re-frame public safety;
•	Re-define the police professional;
•	Establish a dense network of external controls;
•	Implement democratic restructuring;
•	Facilitate citizen participation;
•	Engage directly with private policing
Implicit in our analysis is the idea that policing is 
very much contingent on context. Developments, 
particularly in the second half of the 20th century, 
have it made more evident that policing too is not 
immune to the economic, political and ideologi-
cal relations of dominance and dependency that 
shape the global system. In policing, the hegemonic 
discourse of security, the ascendancy of technoc-
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ratism,116 the increasing reliance on technology, the 
pervasiveness of marketization and privatization,117 
all reinforce the sense that it is irreversibly subject 
to homogenizing forces that traverse national con-
texts. Post- 9/11 developments, combining a police 
response both to the perceived threat of interna-
tional terrorism and the higher levels of popular 
mobilization against austerity are also characterized 
by a regression to more paramilitarized, intrusive, 
violent and unaccountable forms of policing. Ulti-
mately, however, police systems continue to reflect 
the characteristics of their particular social forma-
tions. In what follows we flesh out the six tenets we 
list above, but we wish to warn in advance that their 
precise elaboration requires additional reflection on 
the national context in each case. 
6.1 Re-frame public safety
It is imperative that the democratic Left whether 
in opposition or in government establishes a set of 
fundamental principles guiding its approach to-
wards the police. In capitalist societies, the police is 
made up of a constellation of institutions  that are 
deep-rooted and essential to the state which cannot 
be abolished or radically reformed in an instant. 
The Left cannot afford to adopt a political practice 
of permanent radical opposition against the police. 
Such a stance is likely to alienate, and it has already 
alienated social groups that are critical for the con-
struction of a wide political alliance sharing an egal-
itarian and emancipatory social vision. The longer 
the Left ignores what social order will look like the 
day after being elected the longer it relegates itself 
116  Richard V. Ericson and Clifford D. Shearing, „The Scientifica-
tion of Police Work,“ Pp. 129-59 The Knowledge Society: The 
Growing Impact of Scientific Knowledge on Social Relations, eds. 
G. Böhme and N. Stehr (Dordrecht: D. Reidl, 1986). 
117  Patricia Ewick, „Corporate Cures: The Commodification of 
Social Control,“ Studies in Law, Politics, and Society 13 (1993): 
137-5, Ian Loader, „Consumer Culture and the Commodifi-
cation of Policing and Security,“ Sociology 33 (1999): 373-9, 
Rigakos, „Hyperpanoptics as Commodity: The Case of the 
Parapolice,“ 
to permanent opposition.118  An understanding 
and communication of how “public safety will be 
better,” and how “streets will be more peaceful” and 
personal safety enhanced must be articulated to the 
general electorate not because it is a useful plank but 
because the democratic Left should have an agenda 
for making this happen.
The Left must acknowledge, become aware and 
study carefully the contradictions that traverse 
the police apparatus, as any programme for police 
reform, however gradualist, critically depends on 
their exploitation.  Such contradictions are en-
gendered by both the social composition of police 
services as well as their institutional mission and 
history. The modern police is decidedly not an elit-
ist institution: it recruits widely from popular social 
strata and therefore its organizational membership 
is by no means foreign to the conditions of everyday 
life, the problems and sensibilities of the people.119 
The structure of police work involves a constant in-
terfacing with these very same conditions and there-
fore it is untenable to think that these subjectivities 
are permanently and irreversibly alienated upon 
entering the police service. It must be understood 
that forging of an outlook of the police as an organ-
ization inimical to the people involves an extraordi-
nary amount of effort to systematically indoctrinate 
its membership into the ideologies that organize 
the apparatus. Much of this is achieved through 
practice.  They are instructed to crush strikes, smash 
protests and form up phalanxes against todays so-
cial movements.  But a significant aspect of under-
standing such deployments concerns appreciating 
118  After a critical lecture on modern surveillance, one of Rigakos’ 
students once asked him the following question: “What does 
the Left intend to do about city-centre surveillance cameras 
after a democratic revolution?” A fair question to which almost 
no consideration has been given by progressive scholars.  
Rigakos responded, “Well, what is the material, ideological and 
social necessity for removing them?”  The point is that these 
types of pertinent questions have been entirely ignored by 
Leftist thinkers.
119  Marx and Engels were wrong when they attributed reactionary 
violence from Bonapartists and other counter-revolutionaries 
as emanating from the lumpen and criminal classes.  On the 
contrary, the evidence shows that they were rather recruited 
from the working classes who wanted the restoration of order.  
See: Bovenkerk, Frank. “The Rehabilitation of the Rabble: How 
and Why Marx and Engels Wrongly Depicted the Lumpen-
proletariat as a Reactionary Force.” The Netherlands Journal of 
Sociology/Sociologia Neerlandica 20 1 (1984): 13-41.
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the characteristic of all bureaucracies to neutralize 
external influences by means of ideological indoc-
trination, material rewards and the rationalization 
of organizational structures and practices.120 
The police are an essential component of the in-
stitutional apparatus of liberal democracy that must 
adhere to its principles and values. Yet while these 
principles of legality, due process, civil and human 
rights, equality, democratic rule and transparency 
are standards by which police activity is routinely 
measured both formally and informally, liberals 
do not own these principles.  They are universal 
attributes of human aspiration that have simply 
been coopted into liberal discourse and tied to 
property rights.121  In many cases they have been 
appropriated from socialist struggles. They need 
not be set asunder by the democratic Left.  In terms 
of policing they simply need to be pushed further 
and in alignment with principles of a new economic 
system within which policing will necessarily play 
an essential role.
Policing is controversial and prone to scandal 
precisely because there is an active contradiction 
between perfecting the repressive function of the 
police and the ideological structures by means of 
which consent of the masses is elicited in a capitalist 
society. This means that the general tools conducive 
to a democratization of the police apparatus are 
already readily available under conditions of liber-
al democracy. The point is not to appeal to those 
principles abstractly and in a defensive manner, but 
rather to bring them at the core and reshape them 
to suit the Left’s political stance towards the police 
in both declaratory and practical terms. The Left 
cannot afford and should not aspire to be anti-po-
lice122 but it has a lot to gain by actively declaring 
and practically elaborating a vision for democratic 
policing. 
120  Max Weber, Wirtschaft Und Geselleschaft, (Tr. As Economy and 
Society), trans. G. Roth and G. Wittich (New York: Bedminster 
Press, 1922/1968)
121  Borkenau, Franz. Der Ubergang Vom Feudalen Zum Burger-
lichen. 1934. Welbilt, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchge-
seschaft, 1976.; Woodiwiss, Anthony. Human Rights. Milton 
Park , UK: Psychology Press, 2005.
122  Except in the abstract sense of interrogating the development 
of the idea of police and its embeddedness with modern capi-
talism.
A third contradiction stems from the fact that the 
police mandate is exceptionally wide. The police 
as a branch of the executive possess extensive dis-
cretion with regard to prioritizing one or another 
aspect of that mandate. All modern political battles 
surrounding policing, from the older concerns 
about police effectiveness to the wave of commu-
nity policing reforms to the present day post-crash 
hardening of police presence and response have 
regarded wrestling political control over that execu-
tive discretion. Yet it is often the case that the use of 
that discretion is guided by emergency, hence a re-
course to force. Only a small fraction of police work 
conducted on an everyday basis involves direct 
coercion. This is not to underestimate the political 
pertinence of the coercive function of the police—
after all, the practical political experience of the Left 
very much attests to that. However, to structure the 
entire programme of the Left around that experi-
ence is the least productive approach politically. 
The police use force, but the use of force is not the 
central characteristic of its contribution to peaceful 
social coexistence: by providing service, mediation, 
arbitration and reassurance the police constitute a 
wide-ranging practical problem-solving mechanism 
for the majority of citizens in everyday life. For the 
Left, a much more fruitful political approach would 
be to openly declare which areas of police activity 
must be prioritised over others, and pursue a polit-
ical programme that actively puts pressure on the 
police to act in that direction. 
At the level of principles, the Left must make a 
firm commitment to the protection of public safety 
as the primary rationale for policing. Among a range 
of possible definitions of the police mission, public 
safety is the most readily definable as a preoccupa-
tion with the minimization of harmful outcomes 
in the course of everyday life and within the con-
tours of established institutional and constitutional 
guarantees of freedom, equality and democracy.123 
A priority on public safety entails a preoccupation 
123  “Public” safety, it should nonetheless be noted, has its limita-
tions.  It  does not  appear to actively recognize private violence 
often perpetuated in the home and seems to reify the distinc-
tion between public life and private troubles.  But our point 
would be that, because the idea of harm is inherently open to 
politicisation,  such private harms can and must be colonized 
by a notion of public safety as part of a Left strategy.
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with the material and subjective conditions for 
peaceful coexistence on the basis of wide consensus 
and adherence to a principle of minimum neces-
sary intervention. Public safety therefore delineates 
policing as a public good which must be universally 
and democratically distributed not only without 
distinction or discrimination based on gender, race 
or social status, but also in close cooperation and 
consultation with the citizenry. 
Public safety provides a definition of the police 
mission that does not engender a permanent ten-
dency for the usurpation of power by the police bu-
reaucracy, as, for example, notions of state security 
do,124 but rather instills an aspiration to alleviate its 
unequal distribution in society.  While the above 
may entail an intensification of police activity in 
certain domains of social life, they also entail a 
relative withdrawal of the police force from others. 
In these cases wider forms of consultation and ne-
gotiation should become the established procedure 
towards achieving regulation: industrial disputes 
being a prime example. But remember also that a 
truly socialist government would have little need to 
deploy the police as strike breakers because the cap-
italist-worker distinction will disintegrate as work-
er-owned enterprises begin to flourish.  On behalf 
of whom will the police enforce wage labour when 
the wage labour system begins to evaporate?  More 
contemporaneously, a number of consequences for 
the organization, standards and deployment of the 
police service flow from this fundamental principle 
of public safety, and they will be elaborated in the 
remainder of this section.  
6.2 Re-define the police professional
An explicit commitment to public safety as the 
defining core of the police mission would entail a 
significant reconfiguration of the mentalities and 
modes of work of police personnel. Historically, 
the provenance of many police bodies and their 
adherence to principles of bureaucratic organiza-
tion have entailed that police organizations have 
been modelled on the template of the military—the 
archetypical modern bureaucracy. The typical out-
124  Mark Neocleous, Critique of Security (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2008)
look of contemporary police bodies is uniformed, 
often armed, with an emphasis on organizational 
rules and regulations governing conduct, proce-
dure, discipline and personnel coordination. Even 
where variations exist, they are often the product 
of a conscious effort at a distancing from the mili-
tary template. It is true that where police structures 
akin to military ones did not occur via a process 
of historical development, police reformers turned 
to such models looking to reinforce the coherence 
of the police organization to reduce the impact of 
external influence and instil public confidence to 
the police.125 
But the war metaphor, it seems, has taken over 
reality—the metaphor of war, on crime, on drugs, 
on terrorism and so on, has been naturalized in 
police vocabulary and mentalities.  This is not to 
say that the police have not always been understood 
as part of the war apparatus, only that their use and 
deployment in this manner has never been so overt 
and unabashed in modern history.
From an organizational viewpoint, this model 
aims to establish effective steering from top to 
bottom by means of centralization, performance 
measures, and the development of elaborate rules of 
conduct and procedure and ultimately disciplinary 
action. It has engendered a constant preoccupation 
with technology, the introduction and deployment 
of ever more sophisticated hardware, from weap-
ons, to communication systems to IT intended to 
maximise operational effectiveness and efficiency. 
Importantly, it has reinforced the notion that police 
affairs can and should be managed effectively on the 
basis of internal procedures, in separation from reg-
ular and extensive external input or oversight. Ad-
ditionally, all these characteristics have been deeply 
ingrained in systems of training and career progres-
sion and are thus reproduced and perpetuated at the 
organizational level and in police mentalities. 
To be sure, the external influences contributing 
to the reproduction of this model cannot be easily 
dismissed. The modern police have clear and strong 
connections with what today can be called the secu-
rity-industrial complex. Budget restraints and the 
125  Clive Emsley, The English Police : A Political and Social History, 
2ed. (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf ; St. Martin‘s Press, 
1991, Clive Emsley, „A Typology of Nineteenth Century Po-
lice,“ Deviance et Societe 3.1 (1999): 29-44
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perpetuation of fiscal crisis call for organisational 
efficiencies and ‘streamlining’. A tendency towards 
legalism is underpinned by the very institutional 
position of the police and the desire to establish 
controls over this critical branch of the executive. 
But the undesirable consequences of militarism 
and bureaucratism in police organization are well 
recognized today. Militarism contributes to the pro-
liferation of confrontational styles, authoritarianism 
and excessive force.126 Bureaucratism encourages 
shortcuts and the emergence of informal systems of 
rules127 only accessible to and understood by insid-
ers (the notorious ‘police culture’).128. The consid-
erable adverse effects on the personal wellbeing of 
police personnel have also been clearly recognised. 
Ultimately, the dominant model of police organi-
zation stifles initiative and creativity, particularly 
where it is most needed, that is, in the delivery of 
police service by front-line personnel. 
An explicit priority on public safety repositioning 
the role of the police as a mechanism for the facili-
tation of peaceful coexistence within the framework 
of constitutional guarantees and freedoms entails 
a drastic shift in the definition of the core police 
technology. It thus entails a re-envisaging of the 
police service, bringing the qualities and abilities of 
police personnel at the forefront of considerations 
of strategy, design and modes of delivery. In short, 
it calls for a new ideal of police professionalism, 
nurturing the mediational and restorative qualities 
of the police role and the development across the 
membership of the police organisation of social 
awareness, expertise, initiative and sound decision 
making according to widely accepted and agreed 
standards. This position is by no means a call for a 
new type of technocratism—it rather flows from the 
realization that the present state of thinking about 
the police severely lags behind from a recognition 
that in the social division of labour police work 
126  Peter Kraska, Militarizing the american criminal justice system 
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2001); William Geller 
and Hans Toch, Police violence (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1996).
127  David J. Smith and Jeremy Gray, Police and people in London 
IV: the police in action (London: PSI, 1983).
128  For an outline of the idea of police culture and its implications 
in police practice see Jerome Skolnick and James Fyfe, Above 
the law: police and the excessive use of force (New York: Free 
Press, 1993)
primarily constitutes intellectual labour. Militarism 
and bureaucracy have provided flawed notions of 
police professionalism and scientific police precisely 
because they suppress that reality. This is also why 
the development of a police professionalism that re-
sembles that of other professions have been partial 
and incomplete across police organizations across 
contexts.
A move towards building up a new type of pro-
fessional autonomy of the police mean to establish, 
encourage and strengthen certain minimum key 
characteristics of professionalism among the mem-
bership of the police organization: a reference to a 
developing body of knowledge, a code of conduct, 
the establishment of professional associations and 
a concern about the active and continuing devel-
opment of skills and abilities pertaining to the val-
orization of the above knowledge in the interfacing 
of the police with the citizenry. Indeed, this prob-
lem-solving, diagnostic approach to professional 
development needs to be inculcated as part of the 
police officer’s initial training.
While it is true that some of these elements are 
already present in some contexts, police activity is 
typically determined by bureaucratic prerogative, 
top-down decision-making  and tradition rather 
than evidence-based practice that is open to de-
liberation, dialogue and innovation. It is doubtful 
whether a universal path towards the establishment 
and strengthening of these characteristics can exist. 
At a minimum, nurturing  a new type of profes-
sionalism would mean that organizational struc-
tures must be conducive to the production and 
evaluation of pertinent knowledge and information; 
information flows between police organization and 
the community and also between different sections 
of the police organization must become genuine-
ly reciprocal; the police must become organically 
integrated into the wider circuits of knowledge 
production regarding the life and welfare of the 
communities they police; a code of conduct re-
flecting the resolution of issues on the basis of core 
principles and the evolution of collective experience 
must take precedence over strictly organizational 
considerations; structures and procedures allowing 
not only recruitment and initial training according 
to high standards, but also continuous career-long, 
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university-based learning and training must be in-
troduced.
As we have already noted, the potentially critical 
contribution of police unions must also be fully 
acknowledged. Today, when unions enjoy insti-
tutional legitimacy and formal recognition, they 
are at best pursuing a role in defending the occu-
pational rights and conditions of work and pay of 
their members. In the public sphere, they are forced 
into the straightjacket of managing the image and 
other consequences of the occupational isolation 
engendered by the prevailing police models. The 
fact remains that police unions are best placed to 
represent the collective experience of police per-
sonnel and to handle critical discrepancies among 
categories of police personnel in terms of gender, 
race and even rank. Not only should their growth 
should be encouraged but police unions should be 
fully integrated into the circuits of professional de-
velopment both within the police organization and 
in collaboration with external agencies. 
6.3 Establish a dense network 
of external controls
As we have indicated, democratizing the police 
entails an institutional redesign that renders the 
police more responsive and more accountable to 
those receiving the police service. At the level of 
constitutional principle, the police are positioned 
as a branch of the executive and are thus subject 
to the system of checks and balances that typically 
characterizes the organization of powers in liberal 
democratic polities. The police are subject to the 
laws governing their activity and it is for the courts 
to decide whether a violation of the law has oc-
curred in the course of police activity. This general 
configuration of power typically allows a consider-
able margin of discretion to police organizations. 
Those higher up in the hierarchy of the executive 
can lay down the strategic goals and targets for the 
service but it is typically for the police to decide on 
the particular goals, means and methods they deem 
necessary for carrying out their mission and duties. 
Judicial scrutiny is retrospective. One of the conse-
quences of prevailing notions of police professional-
ism is the idea that the police have the responsibility 
and the right to manage their domain of activity 
and that this can and should be achieved by means 
of internal rules and procedures. The influence of 
external agencies is undesirable and whenever it is 
exerted, it is seen as an intrusion. 
This general regime grants the police operational 
independence in principle, even though its precise 
margins can vary across jurisdictions. It is of course 
possible to adjust the institutional design around 
the police in order to achieve tighter strategic con-
trol, whether on police activity as such, by develop-
ing further the system of legal rules governing it, 
or police organizations more generally, by setting 
out more elaborate targets or installing budgetary 
controls and so on. On the other hand, courts can 
play an important role precisely by adjudicating on 
conditions governing the application of legal norms 
pertaining to police activity. These paths of exert-
ing control over police activity are constitutionally 
sanctioned, well established and, depending on the 
particular context, they have proven to be largely ef-
fective, particularly under conditions of heightened 
popular pressure. But the problem with the solu-
tions emerging from these paths is that they tend to 
be reactions to issues that have become highly vis-
ible and widely acknowledged. They do not neces-
sarily ensure the higher levels of responsiveness and 
accountability desirable for democratic policing in 
so far as they are less likely to bring about lasting or-
ganizational and cultural change. There is a difficult 
balance to be achieved that involves the retention 
of a healthy concept of police professionalism and 
the challenging of the police managerial prerogative 
under conditions of liberal democracy. 
One of the absolute requisites for democratic 
reform has to do with the recognition that the 
problems of policing are not technical issues to be 
decided by experts and technocrats. If the purpose 
of policing is to ensure the conditions of peace-
ful coexistence in society, then the questions of 
values, interests and priorities it involves must be 
resolved politically by an informed and empowered 
citizenry.129 This requires consistently high levels 
of transparency, firstly in the sense that detailed 
information about the methods and outcomes of 
police activity must be widely available. Although 
129  Ruben Rumbaut and Egon Bittner, “Changing conceptions 
of the police role: a sociological review.” Crime and Justice 1 
(1979): 239–298
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some jurisdictions do better in this respect, the 
norm is that the volume and detail of available 
information are nowhere near the levels necessary 
to assist citizens reach informed views about the 
issues the police are dealing with or the outcomes 
of their actions. In fact, both principles of sound 
administration and the public interest in the above 
sense dictate the need for extensive reporting. This 
is particularly the case with aspects of police activity 
that are by definition controversial or are known to 
be characterized by biases, such as the use of force 
or stop and search. Pertinent measures of police ac-
tivity at various levels must be agreed on the basis of 
the widest possible political and technical consensus 
and the relevant data in statistical and in narrative 
form must be freely available and accessible pub-
licly without the need of freedom of information 
requests. Particularly in areas of activity which the 
police deem necessary to prioritise on the basis of 
strategic considerations, every interested member 
of the public must be able to access information 
evidencing the need for the particular allocation of 
human and material resources to that end.
Decentralization is key for enhancing the local 
responsiveness and accountability of the police. If a 
requisite of democratic policing is that police forces 
cannot be insular or cut-off from the communities 
that they police, an idea that has gained renewed 
prominence under the rubric of community po-
licing in the past thirty years, it only follows that 
structures of police governance must possess the 
capacity to steer police priorities in accordance to 
local needs. Even systems featuring national police 
forces incorporate elements allowing strategies ar-
ticulated at national and organization-wide level 
to be adapted or adjusted to local conditions. The 
question is the extent to which the prerogative of 
the centre is to be preserved. Undoubtedly, certain 
strategies will be better served and economies of 
scale will be achieved more easily by the retention of 
a number of centralized units, particularly support 
and training units. Therefore, structures of demo-
cratic accountability with a national remit would be 
more relevant that local ones. However, as the bulk 
of police services are delivered locally, there is much 
scope for local structures of police steering and ac-
countability to be given the widest possible control 
over local police forces or formations. 
A democratic Left programme for police reform 
could, depending on the characteristics of the par-
ticular context in each case, be built around the 
democratization and expansion of police boards or 
councils articulated at the levels of national and lo-
cal government and embodying the general idea of 
a ‘tripartite’ system. A national policing board will 
oversee the strategic planning of the police service 
at the national level, and be given the responsibil-
ity and authority to define strategic goals, policies 
and guidelines regarding the development, perfor-
mance, training and funding of the police service, 
and also to control appointments at the highest 
level of police hierarchy where a national structure 
exists. It will have the responsibility to coordinate 
other national bodies involved in the monitoring of 
police activities or the implementation of policies 
pertaining to crime prevention, criminal justice or 
social control, such as a national police complaints 
authority, the prosecution service and so on. 
The national policing board will also have the 
responsibility for accreditation and monitoring  of 
security providers such as worker-cooperative se-
curity firms, part-time or volunteer police or agen-
cies involved in police training and establishing 
a budget for such services in maintaining public 
safety.130 This board should be composed of the 
relevant ministers (justice and/or interior), the 
serving police leadership, members appointed by 
the parliament, representatives of the judiciary as 
well as representatives of other pertinent national 
bodies, including police and other trade unions or 
professional bodies so as to increase input from 
civil society. The board will be guaranteed levels of 
staffing and infrastructure adequate to support the 
elaboration, monitoring and evaluation of policies.
Local police boards will be the corresponding 
structures at the local level, having the responsibil-
ity to articulate strategies, policies and guidelines 
for local police bodies and also to monitor and 
evaluate their implementation. It will control the 
130  A similar system was recommended to the Canadian par-
liament in 2006.  See: Law Commission of Canada. In Search 
of Security: The Future of Policing in Canada. Ottawa: Law 
Commission of Canada, 2006. Available here: https://www.
academia.edu/5948411/In_Search_of_Security_The_Future_
of_Policing_in_Canada
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allocation of funds and also the appointment of 
local police leadership.  There is no reason why a 
competitive system should not be created for these 
appointments on the basis of qualifications and the 
personal vision of candidates who will originate 
from the body of serving police officers holding an 
appropriate rank. Local boards will consist of mem-
bers representative of the local government, the 
serving local police leadership, the leadership of the 
local judiciary and it can be more tightly integrated 
into the life and needs of the local community by 
including a directly elected element rather than 
representatives of local associations who can retain 
a consultative role.
Independent scrutiny of the police can be achieved 
at the national and local level with the introduction 
of parallel structures of citizen oversight, author-
ized to review and investigate police misconduct 
and complaints against the police more generally. 
These civilian oversight bodies should also be able 
to receive complaints from police officers, acting 
as a mechanism to deal with police executive mal-
feasance or harassment against front line officers. 
It is a technical matter whether these bodies will 
constitute a discrete component of the police board 
or a separate public body—the critical element is 
the possibility and guarantee of independent re-
view enabling these bodies to investigate cases and 
evaluate practices from the viewpoint of rights and 
fairness in a timely fashion, with full cooperation 
of the police and without the restrictions typically 
present in judicial procedure. Considerable expe-
rience has been accumulated in the area of citizen 
oversight, which allows a variety of technical solu-
tions regarding the precise remit, organization and 
procedures—including guarantees for the rights 
individual police officers—of such bodies.131 
Internal police procedures must be adjusted to 
integrate with these external controls. Both external 
control systems and the police internally have the 
responsibility to oversee police activity in accord-
ance with the same system of principles and guar-
antees established by the constitutional order and it 
is clearly in the best interest of police organizations 
to ensure that both legal standards and public 
131  Samuel Walker, The new world of police accountability (Thou-
sand Oaks: Sage, 2005).
expectations are met. The problem with internal 
disciplinary procedures is that they are reactive 
and only effective at the level of individual officers. 
While this is an important and well-established 
form of accountability, our call for an intensifica-
tion of data gathering regarding police activity and 
the thickening of external monitoring and controls 
would facilitate the introduction of internal proce-
dures more conducive to organizational change and 
operating in a proactive fashion too. There is now 
good evidence that more intensive and comprehen-
sive personnel assessment systems can lead to the 
early identification of issues not only at the level of 
individual officers but also across the organization. 
Such systems not only allow a less punitive, less dis-
ciplinary approach towards officer misconduct but 
they can also be tied to systems of internal rewards 
and the development of good (or ‘best’) practice 
guidelines. The available evidence points to positive 
outcomes on the quality of police service, as well 
as to positive impact on the nature and quality of 
personnel supervision.
Our final point is that all the above steps are syn-
ergistic: existing police organizational structures 
and established procedures are deeply rooted in 
the institutional reality of contemporary liberal 
democracies and cannot be simply by-passed. The 
point of strategy for the democratic Left is to ex-
ploit all possible avenues towards the strategic goal 
of a more transparent, responsive and accountable 
police system. 
6.4 Implement democratic restructuring
If the call to democratize the police has as its end 
the creation of a police service that is more respon-
sive and answerable police service to the people, it 
also aims at the creation of a police organization 
that is more responsive to the needs and aspirations 
of its own people. It is doubtful whether a system 
of democratic external controls will alone suffice to 
engender lasting and profound organizational and 
cultural change in the police, if it is not comple-
mented with a bold and wide-ranging challenging 
of the characteristics of traditional bureaucracy that 
still prevail in police organization. A Left strategy 
for police reform calls for a generalized paradigm 
change that entails a drastic departure from the 
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traditional approaches to which the average police 
bureaucracy adheres. But the success of such change 
will depend heavily on how it will be translated into 
operational concepts and managerial structures that 
can be understood, supported and, ultimately, em-
braced by police personnel.
The approach we have outlined so far carries 
certain unambiguous consequences for police or-
ganization, in so far as we envisage a more intensive 
and extensive interfacing of the frontline police 
personnel with the citizenry within a decentralized 
system in which the production of security is not 
monopolized by the police. To put it bluntly, such 
a vision  cannot be put to action by the traditional 
paramilitary police bureaucracy, which is designed 
as a system of hierarchical control aiming to max-
imise control and neutralise external influences. 
The results of the implementation of community 
policing to date, which has been hailed as the most 
important contemporary innovation in policing 
and similarly calls for an increased reliance on the 
community, greater discretion to front line officers 
and decentralized structures, offer clear indications 
that the traditional police organisational structure 
can be considerably resistant to such changes.
Models of community policing and restorative 
justice offer a compelling progressive vision for 
the restructuring of police organizations precisely 
because they involve a shifting of the focus of police 
work to the performance of socially useful work 
and problem solving in close collaboration with 
the citizenry. Accordingly, organizational struc-
tures must adjust to accommodate a broader view 
of police function that recognizes the importance 
of and assigns legitimacy to order maintenance, 
social service and general assistance beyond the 
traditional focus on law enforcement. The pursuit 
of such a strategy would entail considerable power 
shifts within the police organization firstly due to 
the introduction of much higher levels of decentral-
ization of authority and responsibility towards front 
line personnel. Patterns of work and supervision as 
well as the allocation of resources must be adjusted 
to allow front line personnel teams to work in close 
cooperation with citizens and other stakeholders 
in the neighbourhood or the community and to 
develop approaches and solutions appropriate to 
local conditions.132 This entails that line officers are 
granted higher levels of discretion in both the man-
agement of their own work and also their decision 
making while supervisors must tolerate and even 
encourage the exercise of such discretion. These 
patterns of delivery of the police service correspond 
to the decentralised structures of police governance 
thus leading to higher levels of differentiation and 
responsiveness to local needs. This model does not 
negate the uniform enforcement of legal and ethical 
rules governing police activity but rather places the 
emphasis on preventive action and on a deliberate 
focus on generating responses to substantive prob-
lems in the community.  
Additional adjustments to the organizational 
structures may involve a reduction (flattening) of 
the layers of hierarchy in the police organization 
in order to improve flexibility, project-based work 
and the more fluid integration of community police 
units with other pertinent agencies in the imple-
mentation of local strategies. A change in this di-
rection may also entail a degree of despecialization, 
either in the form of a direct reduction of the num-
ber of specialized units or in the form of a widening 
of the remit of specialized units towards crime 
prevention and problem solving. Despecialization 
does not mean dilution of skills and experience, but 
rather facilitates the nurturing of a more generalist 
type of police officer who will be more knowledge-
able about the local community, its people and its 
problems. What is intended is a more strategic and 
deliberate organizational design that focuses on 
substantive outcomes rather that functional differ-
entiation according to formalistic criteria. 
A more gradualist approach ensuring that coali-
tions between the political leadership and the police 
are built and that each step in the introduction of 
changes in role descriptions, work methods and 
supervision styles will be clearly communicated and 
supported by training, in-house research to identify 
issues and appropriate adjustments in performance 
assessment and reward structures will also be nec-
132  See, for example, Jerome Skolnick and David Bayley, The new 
blue line: police innovation in six american cities (New York: 
The Free Press, 1986); David Weisburd, Jerome McElroy and 
Patricia Hardyman, “Challenges to suprevision in community 
policing: observations on a pilot project.” American Journal of 
Police 7 2 (1988): 29-50. 
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essary—it cannot be assumed that drastic organiza-
tional changes can be simply decreed, particularly in 
contexts where paramilitaristic police bureaucracies 
are firmly entrenched.
 6.5 Facilitate citizen participation
The strengthening and generalization of struc-
tures aiming at encouraging and strengthening 
citizen participation in police decision-making is a 
necessary complement for achieving organizational 
change in the delivery of the service. The overall 
aim is to enhance the rapport of front-line policing 
with already existing citizen activism, to encour-
age a greater number of citizens to participate in 
the identification of issues and the formulation of 
responses, and finally to introduce an element of 
direct citizen involvement in the delivery of the 
police service itself. 
The decentralized, geographically focused struc-
ture of front-line police units should be matched 
with the development of more formal structures 
at the same geographical level in which police and 
citizens can meaningfully consult with each other. 
These structures can take the form of regular open 
meetings, attended by residents of a particular area, 
representatives of any local NGOs or other activist 
organizations, operational police officers as well as 
representatives of local government and other rel-
evant agencies.  A formal record of the discussions 
held during these meetings should be made and the 
issues should be formally followed up in subsequent 
meetings with all sides giving an account of the 
actions and approaches taken in response to these 
issues. 
Private policing providers with a significant lo-
cal presence should also be invited to participate 
and align the delivery of their services with locally 
agreed approaches. The accumulated experience 
indicates that the most significant challenge in the 
implementation of such initiatives is the level of 
public participation, both in quantitative terms and 
as regards the extent to which the composition of 
the citizen group in attendance is representative 
of the local population. Some formalization of the 
meetings (e.g. regular venues and times), guaran-
tees of openness and informality and wide publicity 
could be ways to increase participation and coun-
teract apathy. Police participation in these meetings 
will not suffice in assessing local community needs 
but neighbourhood meetings should be approached 
as a genuine decision-making structure in which 
relevant information can be communicated and 
reviewed reciprocally. The police should be aiming 
to maximize input and provide technical support 
to the deliberations of those meetings; for example, 
the implementation of planned actions should be 
actively backed and monitored by the local crime 
analysis unit.
A conscious effort should be made to ensure that 
the articulation of a geographically focused system 
of police service also includes elements of direct 
citizen involvement up to the level of civilianizing 
some components of the local police organization. 
Neighbourhood watch schemes have been popular 
in various contexts and can prove useful for facili-
tating the implementation of local schemes or en-
hancing communication flows between the public 
and the police. Local schemes may also benefit from 
volunteering which may even extend to the staffing 
of partnership structures or even some local police 
services according to local conditions. 
Finally, serious consideration should be given to 
the development of an auxiliary operational com-
ponent recruited directly from the local population, 
drawing inspiration from special constable systems 
that exist in various countries. Auxiliaries and part-
time police, if given training and allowed to be more 
tightly integrated with operational police units, can 
be a cost-effective way to boost the delivery of local 
police service and at the same time they open up 
possibilities for a higher degree of diversification, 
awareness and responsiveness and build a structural 
integration between police and the public. Every 
effort should also be made to allow their integration 
into the existing police union system with adequate 
democratic voice.  The more diversified and in-
tegrated with the community both the police and 
their associations become the better for democratic 
policing in the long term.
6.6 Engage directly with private policing
The private security industry is omnipresent in 
everyday life and a series of factors, including 
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strong policy preferences to privatization, continue 
to underpin its growth.133 There is significant var-
iation across national contexts regarding the level 
of acceptance and legitimacy of private security 
services and the extent to which they are regulated. 
The expansion of the availability of private security 
services for functions, beyond specialized ones, akin 
to those performed by public police means that they 
are established today as an discrete and important 
component of the production of security in society. 
Both market penetration and the structure of the 
industry, which beyond the big corporate entities 
typically also includes a considerable number of 
SMEs, entail that a democratic Left programme for 
reform in the area of public safety cannot simply re-
affirm the primacy of public policing. Even though 
the democratization and strengthening of the deliv-
ery of public police service may potentially temper 
the levels of demand and reliance on private securi-
ty, many functions will unavoidably remain part of 
private policing work. Additionally, a new approach 
in the allocation of police resources is likely to re-
define the position and rationalize the involvement 
of private security, particularly in the process of the 
procurement of technical equipment and systems as 
well as the contracting out of services.
The model we propose would involve a much 
more active role of the state in the regulation of the 
private security industry, aiming to ensure both that 
the industry conforms to quality standards and that 
it delivers its services in ways that do not contra-
dict the aims and the delivery of the public police 
service. As mentioned, national police governance 
structures must incorporate a mechanism and im-
plement a system of accreditation and quality assur-
ance for the private security industry. In many cases 
the service provided by private security companies 
is labour intensive and this typically has a negative 
133  Spitzer, Steven, and Andrew T. Scull. “Privatization and 
Capitalist Development: The Case of the Private Police.” 
Social Problems 25  (1977): 18-29.; Johnston, Les. The 
Rebirth of Private Policing. London: Routledge, 1992.; 
Jones, Trevor, and Tim Newburn. Private Security and 
Public Policing. New York: Oxford/Clarendon, 1998.; 
Shearing, Clifford D. “Unrecognized Origins of the New 
Policing: Linkages between Private and Public Policing.” 
Business and Crime Prevention. Eds. Felson, Marcus 
and Ronald V. Clarke. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice 
Press, 1997. 219-30.
impact on standards of training, on procedures, 
and on conditions of work and pay for employees. 
Regulation should define what functions private 
policing can perform and under what principles and 
conditions, and also cover the identification, ap-
pearance, procedures and tactics of private security 
personnel. A clear regime of accountability should 
also be established, as private security activity can be 
less transparent. This system should be extended to 
monitor the enforcement of standards on in-house 
security where it exists, since some organizations 
are likely to develop their own provision and thus 
attempt to escape regulation. This is easily corrected 
within an appropriate regulatory regime. 
Another vital step would be to encourage the de-
velopment of alternative industry structures aiming 
to instil a degree of democratization and promote 
better standards of service. While the established 
norm is that private security is entrepreneurial and 
thus governed by the logic of profit maximization, 
there is no reason why state policies should not 
actively encourage the creation of worker cooper-
atives, subject to the same regulatory regime but 
allowing members direct control over training, 
procedures and quality of service.  Cooperatives 
are known to be more enduring structures, they are 
driven by the common interests of their members 
and when they are operated locally they are also 
likely to be more responsive to community condi-
tions and needs. Cooperatives, exactly because of 
their nature, would be brought more easily into 
partnership schemes for the delivery of local police 
services and offer better standards of service, trans-
parency and accountability.  Moreover, such coop-
eratives undercut the dominant model of capitalist 
policing and surplus-value in the process.134 
134  Security contracts are typically exempt. 
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7.0 Democratizing the Hellenic Police
The aim of this section is to briefly consider the Greek context specifically and, in light of the 
preceding analysis, to develop a set of programmatic 
goals for police reform in Greece.  A Left strategy for 
police reform in Greece must deal with a series of 
obstacles that are both objective and subjective. On 
the one hand, the police have historically served as a 
key instrument of authoritarianism in Greece in its 
various royalist, outright dictatorial or reactionary 
forms.  Tight control of the police by these regimes 
has resulted in an organization which has proven 
particularly resistant to reform. On the other hand, 
the long history of right-wing partisanship by the 
police has equally resulted in a long history of well-
earned Left-wing hostility against them.  Beyond 
entrenched militarism and bureaucratism, these 
relations present an additional structural obstacle 
for the democratic reform of the police in the sense 
that the very possibility of reform is likely to be a 
contested issue not merely among the general public 
but also among sizeable segments of the Left. 
A further recent difficulty arises from the active 
role that the police have assumed in suppress-
ing popular dissent against the ongoing extreme 
austerity programme implemented by the right-
wing government under the superintendence of the 
IMF-ECB-European Commission ‘troika’. Politi-
cal polarization in Greece appears to be fostering 
increased levels of extreme-right (Golden Dawn) 
influence among front-line police personnel,135 and 
compelling evidence of police and Golden Dawn 
complicity have repeatedly surfaced in the national 
and international media.136 While this suggests that 
135  Georgios Papanicolaou and Ioannnis Papageorgiou, 
“The Police and the Politics of the Extreme Right in 
Greece,” 41st Annual Conference of the European Group 
for the Study of Deviance and Social Control (2013), vol.
136  Sarantakos, G, and Maria Psara, “The Black Column 
of Golden Dawn Inside the Hellenic Police.” Ethnos, 25 
November 2012; Mason, Paul, “Alarm At Greek Police 
‘Collusion’ With Far-Right Golden Dawn,” BBC News 
(2012); Kalyviotou, Maria, “Golden Dawn in the Role 
of Riot Police Vanguard,” I Avgi (2009); Chatzistefa-
nou, Aris, “Golden Dawn Has Infiltrated Greek Police, 
Claims Officer,” Guardian.co.uk (2012).
the police are typically unresponsive to popular 
pressure for reform in any case, it also means that 
various segments of the police apparatus will likely 
particularly resist a police reform programme by 
any government of the Left. 
7.1 History
The current police system in Greece features a 
single national police force, the Hellenic Police. 
Responsible for core police services as well as state 
security functions throughout the Greek territory 
except ports (which are under the jurisdiction of 
the Coast Guard), the Hellenic Police is an organ-
ization distinguished by military hierarchy, and 
disciplinary organization in the tradition of Conti-
nental gendarmeries. It is a service of the Ministry 
for Public Order and the Protection of the Citizen, 
which is a branch of the Executive separate from the 
Ministries of Defence and of Justice. 
Historically, the Hellenic Police originated from 
the merger of Greece’s oldest and largest police 
force, the Gendarmerie (1833–1984) and the more 
recent City Police (1920–1984). The former was 
established immediately after Greece became a sov-
ereign state in 1833 by the Regency regime along 
the lines of the French gendarmerie. The milita-
rized, bureaucratic and hierarchical organization of 
this body proved a key tool for consolidating state 
sovereignty and the pacification of the countryside, 
particularly for the suppression of local revolts and 
banditry. The latter, had been the result of the work 
of a British police mission to Greece and emerged as 
a response to the modernization of policing in the 
rapidly developing urban centres in the first quarter 
of the 20th century. Formed as a “civil police” force 
along the lines of the Metropolitan Police in Lon-
don, it represented a conscious effort at a distancing 
from the gendarmerie style of policing.  Despite 
initial plans its jurisdiction remained limited to only 
a few major urban centres (excluding Thessaloniki). 
While the City Police retained values and stand-
ards aspiring to police professionalism, it too be-
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came progressively assimilated by the pervasive re-
pressive orientation of Greek policing and its close 
interweaving with political power centres.   The 
emphasis on national security and political surveil-
lance of the population throughout the post-civil 
war period significantly shaped the Greek police.137 
These characteristics became untenable after the 
reestablishment of parliamentary democracy in 
1974, particularly after the PASOK socialist party 
came to power in 1981. The amalgamation of the 
two forces placed the new unitary police force under 
the direct control of a political authority (Ministry 
of Public Order), aiming clearly to prevent the 
survival of the police mechanism as a relatively au-
tonomous power centre. Since 1984 however, it is 
doubtful whether key structures, which determine 
the organizational and functional orientation, the 
operational choices and professional attitude of the 
staff have been modified successfully by the 1984 
reform. Ultimately, in 2000 new legislation by the 
same PASOK party restored the institutional au-
tonomy of the police by reinstating a separate police 
staff (the Hellenic Police Headquarters) as an inde-
pendent command authority of the police.138 
7.2 Structure 
The Hellenic Police comprises central and region-
al units and it is organized hierarchically in terms 
of both its administration and the geographical 
137  George S. Rigakos, and Georgios Papanicolaou, “The 
Political Economy of Greek Policing: Between Neolib-
eralism and the Sovereign State,” Policing and Society 
13, no. 3 (2003); Sofia Vidali, Crime Control and State 
Police: Ruptures and Continuities in Crime Policy (Vols. 
A’ and B’) (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers (in 
Greek), 2007).
138  Sofia Vidali, Crime Control and State Police: Ruptures 
and Continuities in Crime Policy, Vols. A’ and B’ (Athens: 
Ant. N. Sakkoulas (in Greek) , 2007); Georgios Papani-
colaou, “Greece,” in Plural Policing: A Comparative Per-
spective, ed. Trevor Jones, and Tim Newburn (London: 
Routledge, 2006).
distribution of its services.139 The internal division 
of labour and responsibilities also reflects this hi-
erarchical cascading.   For example, a directorate 
with a particular area of responsibility operating 
at a central unit has a coordinating or supervisory 
role over regional units conducting operations in 
the same area of responsibility. As the force’s top 
staff formation, the Greek Police Headquarters is 
the superior authority of all other services. It plans, 
directs, monitors and controls the activity of all po-
lice services and has overall responsibility for their 
operation. Other central units exist but their remit 
is specific to logistical support, police training and 
technical or scientific support of police operations 
(e.g. forensic laboratories), or, in the case of Office 
of Internal Affairs, to internal investigations across 
the organization. All other formations except those 
explicitly designated as central are designated as 
Regional Services and constitute the operational 
branch of the Hellenic Police. Their jurisdiction is 
also defined geographically and largely follows the 
general patterns of the territorial organization of 
Greek administration into regions, regional depart-
ments, municipalities and municipal departments. 
Accordingly, there are 14 General Police Directo-
rates, which include their own staff formations as 
well as territorially distributed subdivisions, depart-
ments and stations. Special regulations apply to the 
organization of the General Police Directorates of 
Attica and Thessaloniki, due to the population size 
and heterogeneity of the operating environment of 
these regions.
From an organizational point of view, there has 
been a clear tendency since 1984 towards the de-
velopment of additional staff formations and stra-
tegic units both centrally and at the regional level. 
Particularly since the 1990s this trend has been 
complemented by the creation of new special units 
at central and regional level by means of upgrading 
139  In what follows we do not take into account the recent 
law 4249/2014, which, by and large, reshuffles the 
already established characteristics of the Hellenic Police 
organization and reinforces the operational autonomy 
of its various branches. The implementation of the bulk 
of the changes introduced by this legislation depends 
on secondary legislation, which is reportedly under 
preparation by the Ministry of Public Order. The gov-
ernment’s initiative appears to be rather precarious and 
has been met with severe criticism by the police unions. 
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or restructuring existing units, such as the establish-
ment of the Department of Special Police Controls, 
the evolution of the Border Guards branches into 
Illegal Immigration Control Departments, the es-
tablishment of the Directorate of Special Crimes of 
Violence (anti-terrorist unit), the establishment of 
the Financial Police Department as an autonomous 
central unit and so on. These organizational chang-
es do not merely reflect the increasing complexity of 
the operational environment of the Hellenic Police 
(the task of policing per se), but also the increasing 
complexity of relations of the police apparatus with 
the political leadership as well with internation-
al power centres influencing national approaches 
towards issue areas such as serious and organized 
crime or border controls.140
With regard to matters of personnel, the hier-
archical organization of the Hellenic Police is re-
flected in the rank structure, which corresponds to 
that of the Army. As such, special rules apply to the 
performance of police duties and discipline while 
police officers are legally presumed to be constantly 
on a state of alert. The general rules regarding the 
status and obligations of civil servants in other gov-
ernment branches do not apply to police personnel. 
Police officers are regularly armed while on duty. 
Regular police officers constitute the main but not 
the only category of police personnel. The Hellenic 
Police employs civilian personnel who are either 
permanent staff or contracted to perform support 
and auxiliary roles, such as craftsmen, cleaners 
and so on. Different categories of police personnel 
exist. For more specialized support roles, such as 
medical care, IT support or forensics, special rules 
for qualifications and recruitment exist and these 
members of staff are also incorporated into the rank 
structure. Another special category originates from 
the bodies of Border Guards and Special Guards, 
which were established in the late 1990s but have 
been subsequently incorporated into the regular 
police staff. Border and Special Guards had been 
introduced as lower-cost solution to border controls 
and the protection of vulnerable infrastructure, in-
stallations and public buildings. At the time of their 
initial recruitment, special selection criteria applied, 
140   Vidali, Crime Control and State Police: Ruptures and 
Continuities in Crime Policy (Vols. A’ and B’).
prioritizing candidates with specific physique and 
military experience, and their training was fast-
tracked. Additionally, the personnel of these special 
bodies were excluded from rank progression. After 
2008 both categories were incorporated into regular 
police personnel as general duty police officers at 
the rank of constable. They were nevertheless not 
given the power to perform any tasks relating to 
preliminary investigation.141
Regular police personnel are divided into the 
categories of officers (Police Second Lieutenant to 
Police Lieutenant General rank) and non-commis-
sioned officers (Police Constable to Police Sergeant). 
Different procedures exist for the recruitment of 
officers in each category and they are trained in 
separate police colleges. Since 1994 all personnel 
have been recruited via the higher education en-
trance national examination. The upwards mobility 
of non-commissioned personnel is restricted, as 
officers are either required to take a special entrance 
examination for admission to the Police Officers 
College or graduate from a special warrant officers 
school. A special examination is also required 
for the promotion to the rank of Police Sergeant. 
Although the introduction of examinations as a 
generalized procedure for recruitment and career 
progression is considered as an important step to-
wards modernization, both training procedures and 
the criteria for rank progression have been criticized 
on a regular basis. This is criticism is particularly 
common in connection with the training in Police 
Colleges where there is a continuing emphasis on 
discipline and military-style conditioning, while 
the actual curriculum has been criticized as far too 
formalistic and inflexible.142
Police operations in Greece fall into two general 
categories according to the law. First, there is gener-
al policing, which pertains to the protection of pub-
lic peace and order, and involves such activities as 
141  Rigakos, and Papanicolaou, “The Political Economy of 
Greek Policing: Between Neoliberalism and the Sover-
eign State.”
142  Giorgos V. Papakonstantis, Hellenic Police: Organi-
zation, Policy and Ideology (Athens, Greece: Ant. N. 
Sakkoulas (in Greek), 2003); Evaggelos Stergioulis, The 
Greek Police After the Political Changeover (1975-1995) 
(Athens, Greece: Nomike Vivliothike (in Greek), 2001); 
Giorgos V. Papakonstantis, Proposals for the Reform of 
the Hellenic Police (Athens: POASY (in Greek), 2011).
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preventive patrol, public order policing, traffic reg-
ulation and so on. On the other hand, there is public 
and state security policing, which preponderantly 
pertains to criminal investigation. The police in 
this latter context may either independently initiate 
a preliminary investigation as soon as a crime has 
been reported, or they may conduct investigative 
activity in the course of a formal criminal investiga-
tion under the direction of the investigating judge. 
This functional differentiation of police activity as 
established by law traverses the organization of the 
Hellenic Police at central and regional levels and 
units are organized accordingly. As a result, this 
investigative distinction determines the degree of 
specialization of each unit and also defines internal 
practices, techniques, the use of technology, the 
working conditions of staff as well as their approach 
to contacts between the police and the public. The 
law regulates the types of police action explicitly and 
the police are expected to adhere to the principle of 
legality in the course of their activities. Neverthe-
less, practices, and, consequently, levels of discre-
tion vary according to the position of each unit in 
the division of labour in the organization. General 
policing personnel are uniformed, required to carry 
specific equipment and use particular means in the 
performance of their duties defined in detailed reg-
ulations. On the other hand, security policing units 
operate under more relaxed conditions but the out-
comes of their actions are more strictly scrutinized 
as they have to adhere to the provisions of penal 
procedure. 
The performance of the two categories of police 
activity is externally driven by dynamics that cause 
some divergence in the organization. On one hand, 
since the early 1990s there has been a persistent em-
phasis on the public presence of the police, which 
is deemed to contribute to crime prevention and 
provide reassurance to the public. As a result, the 
Hellenic Police has experimented with reinforcing 
preventive patrol, neighbourhood policing schemes, 
and new types of public order units. In practice, the 
implementation of such efforts is heavily under-
pinned by the militarized outlook and mentality of 
the organization. This can be seen in the evolution 
of the deployment, appearance, equipment and op-
erational tactics of the different types of either riot 
police or fast response units since the mid-1990s, 
all of which are characterized by intensified para-
militarization. While there is little evidence about 
the preventive value of such developments, there 
are more indications that they lead to inefficiencies, 
strain human and material resources and further 
alienate the public. On the other hand, the develop-
ment of specialized units dealing with financial and 
organized crime or terrorism has entailed the in-
troduction of new methods or technologies in parts 
of the organization, but it has also rendered their 
activity less conducive to effective external scrutiny. 
Structures of accountability in the Hellenic Police 
are internally managerial and externally heavily, if 
not exclusively dependent on judicial redress. Po-
lice misconduct is investigated internally according 
to disciplinary regulations but little information, 
if any, reaches the public with regard to levels and 
types of misconduct. The creation of an Internal 
Affairs unit in 1999 was hailed as an important step 
towards more effective scrutiny internally. Howev-
er, the service is only required to present an annual 
report via the Minister of Public Order to a perma-
nent parliamentary committee and little informa-
tion is made available to the public. Whatever data 
are available typically fail to inform public debates, 
as these, to the extent that they occur, usually focus 
on incidents causing major public concern and not 
on wider issues. Furthermore, the Hellenic Police is 
subject to external scrutiny by the Greek Ombuds-
man, an independent authority established in 1998 
who has the power to investigate any illegal actions 
or omissions of the police that citizens report. While 
possessing the power to investigate such actions, the 
Ombudsman at best offers an opportunity for medi-
ation between public authorities and complainants, 
and any escalation of action must necessarily take 
the route of seeking judicial redress.143
7.3 Current developments and the 
issue of Golden Dawn
The historical ties of the police with the political 
right in Greece should not be underestimated, and 
cannot be presumed to have laid dormant or inac-
tive after 1974. Immediately after 1981 PASOK’s 
143  Vidali, Crime Control and State Police: Ruptures and 
Continuities in Crime Policy (Vols. A’ and B’).
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initial policies can be seen as an attempt to suppress 
the relationship of the police with the political 
right as well as the conservative, ‘deep-state’ power 
centres operating within the police. However, the 
recent frequent instances of complicity between the 
police and Golden Dawn in the course of regular, 
everyday police operations (such as public order 
policing or even criminal investigation) indicates a 
renewed problem of a different order. 
In Greece, to the best of our knowledge, no at-
tempt has been made to connect the convergence 
between the far right and structures of militarism 
and bureaucratism in the Hellenic Police, a likely 
avenue to illuminate the conditions that underpin 
Golden Dawn’s popularity among rank-and-file 
police officers.  Golden Dawn’s public presence in 
recent years has developed along similar priorities 
as the police: crime and insecurity in urban areas, 
the influx of undocumented migrants, and popular 
resistance against austerity. Arguably, the current 
patterns of police deployment and the development 
of new tactics aiming to address those issues have 
resulted in the forging of practical alliances between 
front-line police units and Golden Dawn which goes 
beyond the question of extant connections between 
higher-ranking police personnel and far-right poli-
ticians. Golden Dawn’s rhetorics appeal directly to 
the spontaneous ideology of police personnel which 
is already heavily skewed towards the right.  As a 
result Golden Dawn has been increasingly seen by 
the police not only as ‘part of the gang’, but also as 
part of the solution in situations where front line 
patrol and emergency response police personnel 
are hard pressed to reassure a heavily agitated and 
polarized public.
Recent developments in Greek policing can be 
directly linked to this development.144 
First, the political leadership has adopted (with the 
acquiescence of police leaders) a peculiar mix of re-
assurance and suffocation in policing the inner city. 
The Hellenic Police already deploy a heavily mili-
tarized presence in Athens which has now become 
generalized with the addition of city centre of riot 
police squads in full equipment. The newly formed 
2,500-strong patrol and emergency response unit 
144  Papanicolaou, and Papageorgiou, “The Police and the 
Politics of the Extreme Right in Greece.”
DIAS which relies exclusively on motorbikes has 
also become omnipresent in Athens and other large 
cities. The squad is armed and intended to provide 
‘rapid and combative intervention’.  But heightened 
militarization and unstructured exposure to street 
conditions are likely to further alienate already 
strained personnel and entrench the stereotypes 
around which their outlook is already structured.
Second, the former Border Guards and Special 
Guards units have been fully incorporated within 
regular police ranks and are regularly assigned to 
regular city patrol units, including DIAS. As the 
background, training and career progression path of 
these individuals differs from those of regular police 
personnel, not only does it reinforce the militarizing 
tendencies of the Hellenic Police, arguably at the ex-
pense of training and socialization into professional 
policing standards,145 but it also proving very fertile 
ground for Golden Dawn’s message. 
Third, the very stance of the political leadership 
of the Ministry of Public Order may be having an 
important legitimizing effect on police practices 
influenced or inspired by Golden Dawn. The (for-
mer) minister Mr. Dendias not only refused to in-
quire into or even verbally condemn the frequently 
reported incidents of police abuses, racist or other 
forms of harassment typically associated with Gold-
en Dawn, but he also backed firmly the ‘Xenios 
Zeus’ police sweep operations against migrants. In 
the course of these stop and detain operations, large 
numbers of individuals of foreign origin are round-
ed up, and those found to be ‘undocumented’ are 
then detained at the immigration detention camps. 
Thus, serious concerns about racist and xenophobic 
police abuses are now widespread.146
In short, some deep-rooted authoritarian char-
acteristics within the Hellenic police apparatus 
have been further reinforced organizationally and 
by its leadership, while far-right influence consoli-
dates the dominance of a reactionary Weltansauung 
among personnel. Clearly, a change in the political 
message conveyed by the leadership of the Minis-
try of Public Order will not suffice to overturn the 
145  Vidali, Crime Control and State Police: Ruptures and 
Continuities in Crime Policy (Vols. A’ and B’).
146  Human Rights Watch, Unwelcome Guests: Abusive Prac-
tices of the Hellenic Police Against Migrants in Athens 
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013).
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consequences of these current developments unless 
backed by a carefully implemented (and carefully 
timed) intervention in the structures of police gov-
ernance and organization in the country. In Greece, 
the additional challenge is that a Left strategy for 
reform must at once check the advance of the far-
right among police personnel and generate the con-
ditions for a democratizing and thus opening up of 
these structures.
7.4 A Left strategy for police 
reform in Greece 
Part of the problem for establishing a set of re-
form initiatives along the lines of a democratic Left 
in Greece is that the Hellenic Police, for the most 
part, have yet to be fully integrated within liberal de-
mocracy.  It is surely easier to initiate change when, 
at the very least, the institution one is seeking to re-
form – at least in principle if not practice – proffers 
the narrative identity of non-partisanship and plu-
ralism in their history and guiding mission.  This is 
clearly not the case in Greece where we are witness 
to the ease with which Golden Dawn has ensconced 
itself among the police and the widespread support 
that the far right has enjoyed among officer rank-
and-file.  It might seem tempting in the aftermath of 
a Syriza General Election victory, to initiate a purge 
of the established police executive and declare the 
police on their way to reform – this would certainly 
be the normal course of affairs in Greek politics but 
it would not result in lasting and meaningful insti-
tutional reform.
Thus, while the Left must adopt an unambiguous 
set of principles guiding police reform in Greece, 
the precise nature and timing of each step will de-
pend on the evaluation of existing conditions within 
the organization of the Hellenic Police.  In some 
cases this can be a simple as merely modernizing 
elements that have little or nothing to do with a 
politics of police.  In others, it will mean a philo-
sophical shift in priorities and a wholesale change in 
how those priorities are identified in the first place.
The main challenge for the Left is to mobilize 
its political forces in the direction of engendering 
wider consensus among the public regarding the 
necessity of police reform and to create pertinent, 
strong alliances within the police organization. Po-
lice unions will be key to the latter goal and should 
be carefully conscripted in the formulation and the 
implementation of the reform program.147  In fact, it 
would be far more permissible for a party of the Left 
to engage in sustained and overt political maneuver-
ing at the union level than anywhere else and to use 
this as a method of leveraging reform throughout 
the Hellenic Police.  In addition, the wider change 
in the social composition of police personnel since 
the mid-1990s can be assumed to entail that various 
segments of the police will be more willing to sup-
port reform pursuing a strengthening of new police 
professionalism under a different policing model. In 
short, any changes to be initiated must be accepted 
by rank and file officers as benefitting them directly 
and that their interests are furthered by advocating 
reform.
In line with the analysis in previous parts of this 
report, the implementation of such a program could 
take the following steps:  
1. Establish a research and strategic unit guided 
by a team of experts, with extensive powers to 
collect, audit, report and share data on police ac-
tivity and to monitor and evaluate police practice. 
This is, in no uncertain terms, an attempt to build 
an alternative police science that works toward 
the holistic decrease of harm and fosters a strong 
sense of public safety and democratic support 
for the police.  It should have under its remit all 
crime analysis units and a decentralized executive 
mechanism. It should track crimes silenced by ex-
isting class-filtered measures including white-col-
lar fraud, and political and corporate malfeasance. 
All new pilot projects and crime reduction plans 
should be assessed so that the future development 
of democratic policing initiatives can be evaluated 
and shared with policing boards, the public and 
147  This does not mean that the platform on which police 
unions typically campaign should be accepted uncon-
ditionally. In fact, the strategic documents adopted by 
POASY (the largest police union) appear to espouse 
changes of a technical nature rather than a more funda-
mental change of the policing model, see for example 
Greek Centre for Criminology, Report on the Re-Struc-
turing of the Services of the Hellenic Police (Athens: 
Report commissioned by the Greek Federation of Police 
Officers. Sociology Department, Panteion University 
(in Greek), 2001). and Papakonstantis, Proposals for the 
Reform of the Hellenic Police. 
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police administrators.  These should be made 
available electronically and the public should be 
made aware of routine police practices in their 
area through online reporting.
2. Create a comprehensive and multi-tiered per-
sonnel system and database including all existing 
records of experience, qualifications and disci-
pline and establish a system of regular profession-
al development planning and review for existing 
regular and new part-time and auxiliary services. 
Introduce 360-degree peer reviews as a discrete 
component of this system essential for promotion 
and annual or biannual review.
3. Establish an updated system of regular manda-
tory retraining as a distinct component of police 
academy training. Officers sent for retraining 
should be detached from their units and should 
be available for reassignment. Academy training 
should build awareness in recruits and existing 
rank-and-file of their duties as state “workers” 
and as members of an extended democratic po-
licing network with obligations to the public 
and the Hellenic Constitution devoid of political 
partisanship.  Political partisanship among the 
police should come to be viewed as a betrayal of 
democratic policing and the Hellenic Police.148 
4. Establish the National Police Board and bring 
the Hellenic Police under its immediate con-
trol. All remaining administrative services of the 
Ministry of Public Order should be distributed 
between the ministries of Interior and Justice. 
The police should be unshackled from military 
148  There is an old practice in the French Foreign Legion that 
when legionnaires are asked the inevitable question “where 
are you from?” the response would always be “the Legion is 
my country” (see: Tony Geraghty, March or Die: France and 
the French Foreign Legion (Toronto: Grafton, 1986)). This has 
served as a powerful tool for putting distance between the le-
gionanire’s past and toward building solidarity and professional 
esprit des corps among legionnaires for over a century. One 
might magine that a first step toward the political realignment 
of the Hellenic Police through an accelerated passage from 
partisan policing to a new police science would entail a similar 
sentiment of solidarity that similarly puts distance between its 
history and builds a new soldarity and identity.  Thus, one migh 
thope that when a Hellenic Police officer of the future is asked 
“what political party are you with?” the response ought to be 
“the Hellenic Police is my party.”  This shibboleth certainly 
discredits any alignment with right-wing parties as an act of 
betrayal against the police service’s own sense of solidarity. 
hierarchies and national security issues as much 
as feasible..
5. Commission a study for the restructuring and 
decentralization of the Hellenic Police and 
launch a parallel consultation program under 
the authority of the National Police Board. Local 
police boards with democratic representation and 
some budgetary control to initiate crime preven-
tions programs should be established at the end 
of this process.  The existing rank structure of the 
police should be flattened and demilitarized as 
much as possible.
6. Remove all paramilitary police units from reg-
ular service in everyday policing and establish 
levels of staffing appropriate for a use of these 
units under the principle of ‘last resort’ and reas-
sign superfluous personnel to fast response units 
and other decentralized services.  Make extensive 
use of auxiliary and part-time policing to augment 
the Hellenic police as necessary, in the process 
structurally interposing career police with civilian 
parapolice.
7. As a necessary step toward the modernization of 
the Hellenic Police, revise, harmonize and codify 
all existing primary and secondary legislation 
governing police powers and activity and ensure 
that all subsequent legislative changes are made 
with reference to this codification.  At the same 
time launch a consultation program leading to the 
revision of all regulations relating to workloading, 
overtime and other conditions of work within the 
police service. Invite the police union into a lead-
ing consultative role in this process.
8. Review and revise the system of incentives and 
rewards applying to serving police personnel 
and relate it to the outcomes of their professional 
development planning.
9. Revise and codify all legislation regarding pri-
vate security.  Update legislation and regulations 
as needed to provide structural and economic 
incentives toward the creation of competitive 
worker cooperative security firms.  Ensure that all 
security guard licensing is tied to a proviso that no 
security guard may act at the behest of a private 
client that undermines the public interest.
These nine platforms for action are certainly not 
exhaustive and in any case crises of policing and 
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security are common for all governments, the im-
mediacy of which are often distracting from long-
term reform projects such as this one. This is to be 
expected but it should not stop the effort.  What we 
have offered is skeletal.  The specifics of the politi-
cal, economic and social context will often mediate 
what is possible.
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Appendix I:  
A selective survey of national policing models
Rethinking and restructuring policing in the midst of the hegemony of security is a tremen-
dous challenge but it is a challenge that must be 
met if the democratic Left is to build a vision for a 
post-crisis and post-capitalist future across Europe. 
This Appendix is designed to take account of the 
current state of affairs by beginning with a brief 
overview of police organisation and mechanisms 
of accountability in some selected jurisdictions that 
can be thought of as representative of a variety of 
existing police models.  
We have already suggested that it is possible 
to discern certain key characteristics shared by 
policing systems in capitalist society, particularly 
under conditions of liberal democracy. The police 
function within the liberal democratic framework 
is constituted both as a core state activity, expres-
sive of sovereign interests, and as a public good, to 
which every citizen is entitled. This general frame-
work also allows for private policing arrangements 
in the sense that private individuals or legal persons 
are entitled legally to defend their interests against 
infractions and may choose to do so by contracting 
this function to a third party.149 
While it is true that one cannot understand the 
organization of policing in a capitalist economy 
without also examining the private policing sec-
tor,150 in this Appendix we focus on the public 
police in order to best segment an approach that 
should encompass a policy for the reform of both. 
Public police organisations possess a wide remit to 
uphold domestic order, public safety and security 
by preventing or suppressing violations typically 
falling within the general domain of criminal law. 
But it is not unusual for police activity to extend 
149  Stuart Henry, Private Justice: Towards Integrated Theorizing in 
the Sociology of Law (London: Routledge, 1983)
150  Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn, eds., Plural Policing in Com-
parative Policing (London: Routledge, 2006, Rigakos, The New 
Parapolice: Risk Markets and Commodified Social Control, Clif-
ford D. Shearing and Philip C. Stenning, „Reframing Policing,“ 
Pp. 9-18 Private Policing, eds. Clifford D. Shearing and Philip 
C. Stenning (Newbury Park: Sage, 1987). 
in the domain of state security engaging in activity 
against undesirable or subversive political activ-
ity.151 Experience shows that these two aspects of 
policing are closely intertwined, and this connec-
tion has once again been forcefully asserted in the 
aftermath of 9/11.152
While the precise remit of and division of labour 
within police organisations is heavily dependent on 
national and institutional histories, our brief survey 
focuses on those aspects of police organisation and 
structures of accountability that bear heavily on the 
everyday experience of policing for the vast major-
ity of citizens. Our concern is to interrogate certain 
key types of police systems, to establish whether 
there are characteristics more conducive to demo-
cratic control and accountability and under what 
conditions. The Swedish and French systems are 
representative of a ‘continental’ police model, while 
the English and US systems, while significantly 
different between each other, are representative of 
a more ‘decentralised’ police system. As we have 
seen, Greek policing is also a typical example of a 
‘continental’ system.
Case 1: Sweden
Sweden features a state police service comprising 
agencies with territorial and national jurisdiction. 
The service consists of 21 territorial (county) po-
lice authorities, which are responsible for police 
operations in their respective jurisdictions. Each 
authority is directed by a chief commissioner and a 
local police board, all appointed by the government. 
Local police authorities decide on the operational 
plan, budget, internal organisation and rules of 
151  Jean-Paul Brodeur, „High Policing and Low Policing: Remarks 
About the Policing of Political Activities,“ Social Problems 30.5 
(1983): 507-2, Gary T. Marx, Undercover: Police Surveillance in 
America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988)
152  Christian Parenti, The Soft Cage. Surveillance in America: From 
Slave Passes to the War on Terror (New York: Basic Books, 2003, 
Ian Loader and Neil Walker, Civilizing Society (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006)
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procedure. The chief commissioner has responsibil-
ity for the day-to-day operations and finances and 
ensures that operations are conducted effectively 
and in compliance with the law and that they are 
reported reliably and fairly. The local police board 
also has an assistive role. 
The local police authorities are supervised by 
the National Police Board which is the central ad-
ministrative agency for police services and reports 
to the Swedish Ministry of Justice. It is led by the 
National Police Commissioner and also features 
a governing board, all appointed by the govern-
ment. The National Police Board also includes the 
National Criminal Police and the Swedish Security 
Service, which are agencies operating nationally 
with a special remit. The former’s remit pertains to 
serious organised crime, police intelligence and bor-
der controls, while the latter is a state security and 
counter-terrorism agency, and in practice functions 
as an independent authority.
The National Police Board, as central administra-
tive agency for police services, has certain powers 
over the police authorities. It is responsible for de-
veloping and specifying the targets and guidelines 
that the Swedish Parliament and the Government 
decide for police activities and communicating 
them to the entire police organisation. It is also 
tasked with distributing the funds allocated to the 
police by the Government. The tasks of the National 
Police Board also include supervision and coordina-
tion of police services and the development and dif-
fusion of standards regarding tactics, methods and 
technology. However, the National Police Board has 
limited powers to intervene to operations or correct 
the performance of police authorities. It has the 
power to perform inspections and has a reporting 
role being responsible for the annual report, interim 
report and budget documentation. The governing 
board also decides on guidelines, for internal audit 
and regulations directed at individuals, municipali-
ties and county councils.
Police recruitment and training are centralised in 
Sweden. Admission to the police service is subject to 
formal qualifications and successful specialised tests 
and training. The service different types of employ-
ment and salary structures and benefits are decided 
by means of collective agreements at national and 
local level.153
Transparency levels are regulated by the Freedom 
of Press Act, granting to every citizen access to 
police documentation upon request and on con-
dition that secrecy rules do not apply. The matter 
is decided by the local authority. Police authorities 
are expected to keep good order of their records 
and organise their own archives for the storage of 
public documents. The police service is subject to 
judicial control, according to the general rule that 
citizens are able to appeal against decisions of a 
public authority and seek judicial remedy. Proce-
dures exist for scrutiny involving the parliamentary 
ombudsmen and the chancellor of justice, who can 
receive and investigate complaints. However, these 
authorities cannot review or modify the decisions of 
another public authority or court.154
Current proposals for police reform in Sweden 
are in favour of the creation of a unified police 
service in that country with a view to addressing 
disparities in the service. The creation of an inde-
pendent review body with a remit to supervise both 
the police service and the security service is also 
being considered.155
Case 2: France
France is often considered the main source for a 
modern model of policing. Since early as the 17th 
century a state-controlled centralised municipal 
police existed in Paris, along with archetypal mil-
itary-style national police force, the Gendarmerie. 
Historically, the former has provided a model for 
the creation of centralised bureaucratic state police 
forces, while the latter has provided an example for 
the organisation of a police force key to the paci-
fication of the countryside and state building. The 
153  Swedish National Police Board, The Swedish Police—an Intro-
duction (Stockholm: Swedish National Police Board)
154  Swedish Ministry of Justice, The Swedish Judicial System—a 
Brief Presentation (Stockholm: Ministry of Justice, 2012)
155  Swedish Ministry of Justice, A Unified Swedish Police Service - 
Summary in English (Stockholm: Ministry of Justice  
Police Organisation Committee, 2012)
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Italian Carabinieri and the Spanish Guardia Civil 
are similar gendarmerie-type police forces.156 
At present, France features two state-controlled 
national police forces, the National Police whose 
remit is to provide a police service to towns with a 
population of 10,000 or more, and the Gendarme-
rie, who are responsible for the policing of smaller 
municipalities and of the countryside. The National 
Police is a civil police force answerable to the Minis-
ter of the Interior. The Gendarmerie, while formally 
constituting a military body and part of the French 
armed forces, is responsible to the Minister of ln-
terior in matters of public order, to the Ministry of 
Justice for criminal investigations, and for all other 
purposes, to the Ministry of Defence. France also 
features numerous municipal police forces, operat-
ing in cities with a population of over 100,000 under 
the general police powers of the mayor. These three 
types of police in many cases coexist, since areas 
policed by the Gendarmerie have today become 
heavily urbanised, and municipal police forces op-
erate in areas coming  under the jurisdiction of the 
National Police.157 
From an organisational viewpoint, the organisa-
tion of French policing follows closely the structures 
of the French administrative system. The heads and 
other senior personnel of both forces throughout 
the organisation are appointed by the central gov-
ernments, whereas at local level police activities 
are superintended by the prefects, who are also 
officials appointed by the government as central 
state representatives in territorial administrative 
units (departments), and operate alongside elected 
local government bodies. Overall the Minister of 
the Interior exercises operational control in mat-
ters of public order and this authority is cascaded 
locally through the prefects, even though the Gen-
darmerie’s military hierarchical structure entails 
that prefect control is more direct over the National 
Police. Municipal police forces while accountable 
to the mayor and responsible for general police 
duties perform a largely ancillary role particularly 
in matters of criminal investigation as according to 
156  Alan Williams, The Police of Paris, 1718-1789 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979, Emsley, 
Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe 
157  Horton, C, Policing policy in France, (Policy Studies 
Institute, London, 1995).
the law they are required to immediately refer cases 
to either the National Police or the Gendarmerie. 
Police operations therefore are highly centralised 
around the two state police bodies.158
Furthermore, a general distinction that applies 
to police activities in France is that between ad-
ministrative police, pertaining to securing public 
order, including traffic and riot control, and judi-
cial police, which includes criminal investigation, 
arrest powers and other related activity according 
to criminal procedure and under the supervision of 
the judiciary. The consequences of this distinction 
traverse the French police not merely operationally, 
but also as regards personnel, since special proce-
dures are required for any police officer to achieve 
the status of a judicial police officer and therefore 
to exercise the powers vested in that status. This 
differentiation also defines the structure of training, 
career, conditions of work and even appearance, 
particularly in the National Police. Officers who 
do not possess judicial police status have limited 
powers in this respect, and constitute a special 
category of personnel. The same distinction also 
applies to the Gendarmerie but because this police 
force is organised along military lines and has re-
tained a system of territorial presence by means of 
a large number of small units (brigades) which are 
dispersed throughout the country and perform all 
police duties, the division is less pronounced (e.g. 
all personnel is uniformed).159
Overall, France presents the archetypal system of 
state-controlled policing under conditions of liberal 
democracy, as structures of police control and ac-
countability are closely intertwined with the general 
structures of executive and judicial power. As a re-
158  Christine Horton, Policing Policy in France (London: 
Policy Studies Institute, 1995, Jacques de Maillard and 
Sebastian Roché, “Crime and Justice in France: Time 
Trends, Policies and Political Debate,” European Journal 
of Criminology 1.1 (2004): 111–5, Jacqueline Hodg-
son, French Criminal Justice. A Comparative Account 
of the Investigation and Prosecution of Crime in France 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005, Frédéric Ocqueteau, 
“France,” Pp. 55–76 Plural Policing: A Comparative Per-
spective, eds. Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn (London: 
Routledge, 2006). 
159  Horton, Policing Policy in France, Hodgson, French 
Criminal Justice. A Comparative Account of the Investiga-
tion and Prosecution of Crime in France 
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sult, accountability is hierarchical and managerial, 
and largely dependent on legal redress retrospec-
tively. A police union for  the National Police exists 
but apart from giving a public representation to the 
moral and professional interests of its members, it is 
no formal part of police governance in that country.
Case 3: United Kingdom 
(England and Wales)
England is considered to offer a model of policing 
which is usually juxtaposed to the highly central-
ised state-controlled systems that have emerged 
and prevailed historically in continental Europe. It 
is true to some extent that early 19th century po-
lice reform in that country, conscious in its effort 
to eschew characteristics of continental European 
policing that were deemed undesirable in light of 
the English sociopolitical context, produced an 
archetypical civil police organisation in the form 
of the Metropolitan Police Service. The subsequent 
diffusion of this model across the county in the 19th 
century as a replacement of older structures has 
resulted in an configuration of the police institution 
which largely reflects local government structures 
while still permitting significant steering from the 
central government.160 Policing in England and 
Wales (separate legal regimes apply to Scotland 
and N. Ireland) still consists today of 43 territorial 
police forces each covering a particular police area 
and each governed by a separate police authority. 
Nevertheless, national ‘special’ police forces and 
agencies exist in the UK today, and until recently 
a gendarmerie-style militarised police force had 
been responsible for Northern Ireland. In addition, 
the increasingly active role of the Home Office (the 
English Ministry of Interior) is considered to signify 
considerable centralising trends. 
The police system that largely remains in place 
currently was established in 1964. It has been gen-
erally known as the ‘tripartite structure’, according 
to which the responsibilities for the operation of 
the police service are divided between the Home 
Office, local police authorities and chief constables. 
Under this general framework, the chief constable 
160  Philip Rawlings, Policing: A Short History (Cullompton: 
WIllan Publishing, 2002)
is responsible for the direction and control of each 
force in operational matters, a local police authority 
has the responsibility for the general maintenance 
of the police force of its area, including the power 
to establish local policing objectives and to monitor 
police performance, while the Home Secretary has a 
general supervisory role as well as the general pow-
er to issue regulations regarding the government, 
administration and conditions of service of police 
forces.161
Before 2011, local police authorities were inde-
pendent bodies of a mixed membership the major-
ity of whom were representatives of the local gov-
ernment, while the composition of the remainder 
of their membership had varied—the original 1964 
system included members of the local judiciary but 
over time the system shifted towards appointment 
of independent members. Local police authorities 
were abolished in 2011 and were replaced by of-
ficials directly elected for a four-year term, desig-
nated as Police and Crime Commissioners, and by 
new Police and Crime Panels, the majority of whose 
members is nominated by local government. Under 
this new regime, the local authority component 
retains the responsibility to establish a yearly police 
and crime plan regulating police and crime objec-
tives, the allocation of financial and other resources 
and the monitoring of performance of the police, 
but the elected PCCs have a much more prominent 
and active role in the process. PCCs also have the 
power to appoint, suspend or request the resigna-
tion of the chief constable.162 
On the other hand, it is today a largely undisput-
ed fact that the influence of the Home Secretary 
in police governance has increased considerably 
161  Laurence. Lustgarten, The Governance of Police (London: Sweet 
& Maxwell, 1986)
162  The introduction of elected PCCs can be seen as result-
ing in a ‘quadripartite’ rather than ‘tripartite’ struc-
ture Trevor Jones, Tim Newburn and David J. Smith, 
“Democracy and Police and Crime Commissioners,” Pp. 
219–44 Policing: Politics, Culture and Control, eds. Tim 
Newburn and Jill Peay (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), 
Stuart Lister, “The New Politics of the Police: Police and 
Crime Commissioners and the ‘Operational Indepen-
dence’ of the Police,” Policing: a journal of policy and 
practice 7.3 (2013): 239–4, Tim Newburn, “Police and 
Crime Commissioners: The Americanisation of Policing 
or a Very British Reform?,” International Journal of Law, 
Crime and Justice 40 (2012): 31–46
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over time.163 The centralising trends are not visible 
merely by the exercise of central government pow-
ers to establish general objectives and performance 
targets, to issue codes of police practice and general 
regulations regarding personnel qualifications, du-
ties or conditions of work, equipment standards, 
and not least to allocate central government funds 
to local police authorities. Rather this influence 
has increased over time through the consolidation 
or development of nationally relevant structures, 
such as the Audit commission or Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), ensuring 
external scrutiny of the police forces and therefore 
the diffusion of centrally set standards. Further-
more, a number of key policing areas, such as the 
suppression of serious and organised crime, border 
policing or cybercrime, have come under the remit 
of special bodies possessing national jurisdiction, 
particularly the National Crime Agency which has 
been given direct operational or cross-force coor-
dination responsibilities. As instances of regional 
or cross-force coordination or cooperation have 
increased, there are also ongoing debates which are 
typically ignited by central government and regard 
the restructuring of the forces towards a smaller 
number of organisation covering larger areas and 
with a view to increasing operational capacity and 
efficiency.164 
Within this framework, chief constables retain the 
control for operational policing, including decisions 
regarding the day-to-day management of the organ-
isation and operations, the appointment of senior 
staff within the respective organisations and so on. 
The internal unity and discipline of the uniformed 
element of the English police system is secured by 
special regulations that apply to the recruitment, 
training and career progression from the rank of 
constable up to the senior ranks. The organisational 
structure typically includes staff formations and 
support units for the entire organisation. The deliv-
ery of core police services and the interfacing of the 
police with local communities is performed by units 
163  Barry Loveday and Anna Reid, Going Local: Who 
Should Run Britain’s Police (London: Policy Exchange, 
2003)
164  Rob C Mawby and Alan Wright, “The Police Organ-
isation,” Pp. 224–52 Handbook of Policing, ed. Tim 
Newburn, 2nd ed. (Cullompton: Willan, 2008). 
serving particular smaller geographical areas. While 
the operational independence of the uniformed 
element is largely undisputed along the above lines, 
there are aspects of the system that moderate this 
monopoly to some extent. Since the 1990s there 
has been a renewed emphasis on the local delivery 
of police services and continuous attempts to rein-
force the relation of frontline policing with either 
local communities or local stakeholders by means 
of crime and disorder reduction partnerships or 
neighbourhood policing schemes. Related to this 
change has been the introduction of a new category 
of police personnel with limited powers, designated 
as Police Community Support Officers (PCSO), 
who are deployed in neighbourhood policing and 
are complementary of the core force. The English 
system also allows for a limited element of civilian 
participation in the form of Special Constables. 
These are volunteers who undertake to work with 
and support regular police officers for a few hours 
a week. Special Constables are uniformed and have 
the same powers as regular police officers. They are 
subject similar criteria for recruitment and similar 
rules of conduct and discipline as regular person-
nel.165 
There are two levels at which the accountability 
of the English police can be assessed. The above 
should have made sufficiently clear that external 
scrutiny of the police has intensified at a strategic 
level, since performance targets, objectives, strate-
gies are increasingly set in consultation or collabo-
ration with national or local bodies that are firmly 
embedded in the current institutional design of the 
system. There is also a number of stakeholders in 
the form of professional bodies or associations, such 
as the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), 
the Police Federation, the British Association of 
Women in Policing, the National Black Police As-
sociation and so on, which also contribute to the 
shaping of policing policies. On the other hand, the 
primary means of regulating and controlling police 
activity remains judicial redress. There are however 
elements complementing this system by organising 
an independent complaints process. The body cur-
rently responsible is the Independent Police Com-
plaints Commission (IPCC) that was introduced in 
165  Mawby and Wright, “The Police Organisation,”  
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2002. The IPCC has national jurisdiction and is able 
to oversee the handling of complaints by the police 
and also to investigate complaints independently. 
Under this system, police forces retain the respon-
sibility to deal with the bulk of citizen complaints 
against their actions, but complaints or incidents in-
volving deaths, serious injuries, assault and corrup-
tion must be referred to the IPCC. Additionally the 
IPCC take over an investigation when alleged police 
misconduct has raised serious public concerns. The 
IPCC has developed its own infrastructure and spe-
cial personnel to perform its role.166
Case 4: United States
A discussion of policing in the United States, al-
beit necessarily brief is almost mandatory for three 
reasons. Firstly, key developments in the organisa-
tion of the police have taken place in the US since 
the beginning of the twentieth century and there 
is an extremely developed body of thinking and 
research on policing; second, as the US rose to a 
hegemonic position in the international system in 
the post-WWII ear, it has influenced directly and 
indirectly the organisation of police forces around 
the world, and continues to do so today; and, 
thirdly, because crime and crime control has been 
a markedly politicised issue in the US, clear politi-
cally opposed ways of thinking have developed over 
time so that a robust, rich and creative progressive 
approach towards the police exists today. 
The US police system appears to be markedly 
different from the centralised, single or dual police 
continental systems discussed so far. There is a mul-
tiplicity of organisations operating at the Federal, 
State and local levels and the vast majority of US 
police personnel is dispersed in almost 18,000 state, 
county and municipal police organisations which 
vary considerably in size and structure. The bulk of 
the police services to the population on a day-to-day 
basis is delivered by these organisations, as federal 
police organisations have a more limited remit 
being responsible for the investigation and control 
166  Trevor Jones, “The Accountability of Policing,” Pp. 
693–724 Handbook of Policing, ed. Tim Newburn, 2nd 
ed. (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2008), Lister, “The 
New Politics of the Police: Police and Crime Commission-
ers and the ‘Operational Independence’ of the Police,” 
of federal and interstate crime only. Jurisdictional 
overlaps are possible and common, given the frag-
mented nature of the system. Additionally, the pro-
duction of security in the US includes a distinct and 
important private component, as private security is 
a growing business and personnel employed in pri-
vate security clearly outnumber the public police.167
Nevertheless, the paramilitarised bureaucratic po-
lice organisation that is typical of other contexts in 
not by any means foreign to the US. The militarised 
police bureaucracy emerged in the beginning of the 
20th century as a compelling model for addressing 
the issues of corruption and manipulation by local 
politics that had been pervasive in US policing due 
to its fragmented and decentralised outlook. While 
police organisations have remained closely tied to 
the local communities they police, the idea of a par-
amilitary bureaucracy has been heavily entrenched 
in the notion of police professionalism that has 
prevailed in the US. Police reformers sought to 
centralise police administration so as to neutralise 
external influences, define better the mission of the 
police and improve personnel standards, as well as 
the delivery of the police service on the basis of bu-
reaucratic control, specialisation and technological 
advances. Militarism and bureaucratism were also 
at the heart of the system’s response to the perceived 
crisis of legitimation in the 1960s, which the social 
movements of the era engendered. Increased police 
numbers, an emphasis on selection and training, 
the development of highly paramilitarized units, 
the deployment of advanced technological means 
were trends underpinned by the prevailing notion 
of police professionalism. The entrenchment of this 
model was also reinforced by more robust steering 
at the federal level through the work of agencies 
such as the Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration (LEEA) or the Commission on Accredita-
tion for Law Enforcement Agencies.168 
While innovation has occurred mostly within the 
above professional policing framework, after the 
167  Peter K. Manning, „The United States of America,“ Pp. 98–125 
Plural Policing: A Comparative Perspective, eds. Trevor Jones 
and Tim Newburn (London: Routledge, 2006). 
168   Manning, „The United States of America,“ , Albert J. Reiss, Jr., 
„Police Organisation in the Twentieth Century,“ Crime and 
Justice 15 Modern policing (1992): 51-9, Larry K. Gaines and 
Victor E. Kappeler, Policing in America, 7th ed. ed. (Newark, 
NJ: Lexis Nexis : Anderson Pub., 2011)
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1980s a community and problem-oriented policing 
model, emphasising closer ties with the community 
and a tailored policing approach, has gained ascend-
ancy. A significant number of police organisations 
have explored and introduced elements of this strat-
egy, which assigns greater discretion to front-line 
personnel to work with the community, features a 
partnership philosophy and espouses higher levels 
of transparency and accountability at the expense of 
hierarchical control and traditional crime control 
methods. Considerable experience and a significant 
volume of research has emerged from this trend and 
we shall return to the possibilities opened up by this 
model in the final section of this essay.169 However, 
in the post-9/11 era a renewed emphasis on state se-
curity and counterterrorism affecting the US police 
system in its entirety has signified a regression to 
more traditional mentalities in the implementation 
of police strategies.
Along the above lines, US police organisations 
vary in size, structure and methods but are typ-
ically hierarchical, featuring a unified chain of 
command and a military style rank structure. The 
military model is particularly visible in the highly 
specialised outlook and methods of SWAT (Special 
Weapons And Tactics) and other special response 
units which have proliferated since the late 1980s.170 
While recruitment procedures have become more 
stringent and more dependent on prior qualifica-
tions and considerable emphasis has been given on 
initial training over time, US police organisations 
constitute a largely closed system and the staffing 
of higher ranks is achieved predominantly by se-
lection from serving personnel.171 Police chiefs also 
predominantly come from the police ranks within 
the department, but lateral entry is also possible. 
169  Wesley G Skogan and Susan M Hartnett, Community Policing, 
Chicago Style (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, Victor 
E. Kappeler and Larry K. Gaines, Community Policing : A 
Contemporary Perspective, 6th ed. ed. (Amsterdam ; Boston. 
Waltham, MA: Elsevier Anderson Pub., 2011, Michael. Palmi-
otto, Community Policing: A Police-Citizen Partnership (New 
York: Routledge, 2011) 
170  Kraska and Kappeler, „Militarizing American Police: The Rise 
and Normalization of Paramilitary Units,“, Peter B Kraska, ed., 
Militarising the American Criminal Justice System: The Changing 
Roles of the Armed Forces and the Police (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 2001)
171  Carol A Archbold, Policing: A Text/Reader (Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications, 2013)
In the municipal departments, which constitute the 
majority of police organisations in the US, hiring is 
controlled by city government and chiefs typically 
report directly to the mayor or council. As regards 
conditions of pay and work, it is often the case at the 
state and local level that police personnel are able to 
bargain collectively, even though some policy areas 
are excluded from the process. Police unionisation 
has made progress since the 1960s but representa-
tion is fragmented and there is no national police 
union in the US.172 
Police accountability is an important and highly 
politicised issue in the United States. Although the 
professional model is explicitly and highly prescrip-
tive about police ethical conduct, the progressive 
insularity and prevailing mentalities in US police 
organisations have been responsible for significant 
biases in the delivery of police work up to the point 
of engendering considerable strain in the relations 
between police and the public. The professional 
model typically espouses a great degree of autono-
my for the police and the use of internal administra-
tive procedures for the control of the police forces 
on the basis of written rules and regulations, but this 
model is considered responsible for considerable 
failures in many critical issue areas, such as the use 
of force, respect of human rights and so on. Scrutiny 
of US police practices has relied heavily on judicial 
recourse, via constitutional, tort and criminal law, 
and some landmark decisions of the US Supreme 
Court laying down fundamental rules for police 
procedures, such as Mapp v Ohio and Miranda v 
Arizona173 are well known well beyond outside the 
US. External control of US police organisation some 
time involves ad hoc inquiries typically following 
incidents causing significant public concern, and 
increasingly since the 1980s the creation of inde-
pendent  ‘civilian’ agencies with a remit to review 
and investigate citizen complaints. The demand 
for meaningful ways to audit the police externally 
has been a direct consequence of the politicisation 
of the issue of police accountability, particularly 
by the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Political 
172  Gene L. Scaramella, Steven M. Cox and William Mc-
Camey, Introduction to Policing (Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 2011)
173  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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pressure has resulted in a rather synergistic system 
of pursuing higher standards of accountability, in 
which the traditional methods are complemented 
by more intensive—retrospective as well as proac-
tive—monitoring of activity by the police depart-
ments on one hand, and, increasingly, forms of 
citizen oversight.174 
Comparative policing themes
Our brief survey suggests that, even though police 
systems invariably gravitate towards the modern 
institutional forms underpinned by bureaucratism 
and juridicopolitical ideology, history and the par-
ticularities of national contexts weigh heavily on 
their outlook. The latter is a concrete expression of 
how social and political struggles impact the articu-
lation of the hegemonic security apparatus in each 
capitalist society. These characteristics define the 
general margins for the subsequent development of 
those systems and also for the nature and direction 
of police reform within the established sociopo-
litical regime. Within these margins, it is possible 
to conclude that certain configurations are more 
conducive to reform in a progressive direction, 
precisely because their elements are more accessible 
(or amenable) to social and political struggles of 
subordinate populations. 
While change in centralised and heavily bureau-
cratised systems is slow and often more responsive 
to the needs of the state that to the needs of citizens, 
decentralised systems featuring local control of the 
police service offer more possibilities for further 
and substantive democratisation, as they present a 
degree of flexibility and openness to experimenta-
tion with new approaches to organisation and over-
sight. The cases of France and Greece (discussed 
elsewhere in this Report) are indicative of how or-
ganisational change is driven primarily by internal 
forces leading to the refinement of the repressive ca-
pabilities of the police.  Institutional change enables 
higher levels of responsiveness and accountability 
but this has failed to gather pace. 
It is the case that more decentralised models 
permit greater openness to reform, particularly 
174   Manning, “The United States of America,” , Samuel 
Walker, Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Over-
sight (London: Wadsworth, 2001)
when questions of policing become politicised. 
In England and Wales the introduction of elected 
police and crime commissioners has been a re-
sponse to the intense politicisation of questions of 
law and order and, theoretically, an evolutionary 
step within a system featuring high levels of local 
control and accountability. The politicisation of 
policing in the United States continually since the 
1960s has engender higher levels of scrutiny as well 
as the move towards community policing, which, at 
least theoretically, espouses police decentralisation, 
de-bureaucratisation and community involvement. 
Such developments present opportunities both for 
further democratic reform or for a strategic re-ad-
aptation of the repressive apparatus,175 as the role 
and organisation of policing become politically 
contested issues to be resolved by political means. 
Any democratization must be substantive and pen-
etrative of institutions of policing.
It is unfortunate that the Left, particularly in 
societies featuring heavily centralised state police, 
has barricaded itself behind an instrumentalist view 
of the police and has thus eschewed the task of de-
veloping a detailed programme on the question of 
security as a public good to which every citizen is 
entitled. It is true that the Left’s constant exposure 
to the iron hand of the police cannot but dictate a 
radical and possibly unreflexive oppositional stance. 
However, the politicisation of security depends not 
on reactive protest alone, but on whether questions 
of policing and its delivery are embraced and fought 
out by wider social alliances, social movements and 
more generally the people whose lives are typically 
more exposed to the reactionary effects of police 
paramilitarism and bureaucratism. If the Left is to 
develop a strategy for intervention into these im-
portant fields of struggle, then it must reappraise its 
theoretical understanding of the question of securi-
ty and study the characteristics of the production of 
security by the contemporary police organisation, 
its social composition, the division of labour within 
it and so on. The strategic direction towards which 
the Left should pursue police reform is the radical 
decentralisation of the governance and the organ-
isation of the existing police service, but deciding 
175  S Herbert, ‘Policing the contemporary city: fixing bro-
ken windows or shoring up neo-liberalism’, Theoretical 
Criminology vol. 5, no. 4, 2001, pp. 445-466.
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what the particular steps in that direction can be will 
heavily depend on a clearer understanding of the 
contradictions residing in the police apparatus and 
on how they can be activated as issues to be resolved 
in the political arena.  
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